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Abstract 
Historically underpriced, tickets for shows and sports games are frequently purchased just for the 
intent of resale at a higher value. This action has helped facilitate the creation of a large online 
secondary market for event tickets. Trying to capture the excess demand left by primary sellers, 
online ticket brokers often drastically inflate prices from face value. Using data from Ace Ticket 
from the second half of the 2011 NFL season, this thesis examines what factors drive ticket price 
movement. By splitting the effects into a team strength component and a days until the contest 
component, this study finds two major factors correlated with changes in ticket prices. The 
results show that, while playoff chances are the best proxy for team strength, the days until the 
game element (in particular the last week before a contest) has the most significant effect on 
prices. Often dropping prices by over 50 percent, ticket brokers scramble to make a sale during 
the last week. Although individual NFL teams can aggressively price their tickets to capture 
more revenue immediately from the primary market, this analysis shows that they may not be 
able to compete with ticket brokers who can adjust prices daily without the fear of alienating fans 
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I. Introduction 
 Sports economists widely accept that sporting event ticket prices are far below their 
revenue maximization values. Even as the cost of attending games has dramatically increased 
over the past couple of decades, games continue to sell out implying significant potential for 
increased profits. The challenge for a sports franchise is discovering the competitive ticket price 
for each seat while continuing to attract large numbers of fans. While certain demand factors 
such as quality, day and time, and alternative viewing options vary depending on the contest, 
teams have been reluctant to significantly raise or lower prices to effectively capture the way 
demand moves with these changes. This hesitancy has resulted in a lack of understanding of the 
variables that influence a consumer’s willingness to pay for event tickets. 
 In this thesis, I will present evidence of inelastic pricing and the apparent reasons for its 
continued use. Looking at both concessions revenues and public goodwill, I will show that, as 
profit maximizing businesses, teams should take a more aggressive approach to pricing. To 
better understand the factors that affect the demand for tickets, I cover multiple attendance 
models in various sports leagues. Since franchises have begun using different pricing 
approaches, I will reference the success they have seen with only minimal changes. Similarly, I 
will make comparisons to other markets where dynamic ticket pricing approaches have paid off. 
Finally, I will present the secondary market for event tickets, its current effects on the ticket 
industry, and its likely evolution. 
 By using ticket prices collected from the secondary market for the 2011 NFL season, I 
hope both to explain dramatic price shifts and to highlight the need for more aggressive primary 
market pricing. Teams collect a significant portion of their game revenue from ticket sales, but 
secondary markets are still able to capitalize on their inability to capture demand. With a more 
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intelligent approach to ticket pricing, the primary market may be able to take a significant 
portion of the secondary market’s revenue. 
 
II. Literature Review 
A. Pricing and Demand for Professional Sports 
 Since, at their core, sports franchises are businesses trying to maximize profits, 
capitalizing on consumer demand should be extremely important. Working with ticket price data 
for 1975-1988 in Major League Baseball 
(MLB), Rodney Fort tested the assumption 
that all teams price their tickets on the 
inelastic portion of demand. His results 
overwhelmingly support the hypothesis. This 
means they could have increased both 
revenues and profits by raising ticket prices. 
Figure 1 displays the results of Fort’s 
calculations. MRG
i
 represents the marginal 
gate revenue for team i. Similarly, MRT
i 
is 
the marginal local television revenue for 
team i. Lastly, the AVE column is the 
marginal local television revenue average for 
every team in the league except for team i. 
Fort assumes that teams select a marginal 
gate revenue goal that depends on the cost of 
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talent, local television revenue, and average television revenue for the rest of the league. He uses 
cost of talent as a proxy for winning assuming that the more talent a team has, the more it wins. 
An important element in his analysis is the tradeoff between gate revenue and local television 
revenue. Ultimately, he determines that team i is pricing on the inelastic portion of attendance 
demand for winning if MRT
i is “large enough” compared with average marginal television 
revenue for the rest of Major League Baseball.
1
 As seen in Figure 1, according to Fort, from 
1975 to 1988, every MLB team priced its tickets on the inelastic portion of the attendance 
demand curve for winning. 
 Fort conjectured that the variation from pricing to maximize gate revenue, or unit 
elasticity ticket pricing, may be because of concessions revenues.
2
 In a 2007 study, Krautmann 
and Berri discovered that concessions revenues may make up for a large portion of gate revenues 
lost from pricing tickets on the inelastic portion of the demand curve. Assuming that the 
marginal cost of admitting another fan to a game is less than the marginal concessions revenue 
that the fan provides, economic theory suggests that owners should price tickets lower than the 
unit elastic price. Krautmann and Berri find that the ticket price discount for the MLB is 
approximately 56%.
3
 Believing that concessions could cover a gap this large is difficult. Figure 2 
shows the average ticket price for each team in the four major sports and the average for each 
league for the 2010-2011 seasons. As shown, on average, ticket prices vary $66.65 for the 
National Football League (NFL) team with the most expensive tickets (New York Jets: $120.85) 
to the team with the least expensive tickets (Cleveland Browns: $54.20). The variations in ticket 
prices in other leagues are also sizeable, as average team ticket prices vary approximately $38, 
                                                          
1
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$72, and $61 for the MLB, the National Basketball Association (NBA), and the National Hockey 
League (NHL) respectively. 
 
 Figure 2 - Average Ticket Prices (2010-2011) 
 
          Source: Team Marketing Report 
 Large variances in ticket prices generate significant differences in gate receipts within 
each league, as they are almost always the largest portion of total revenue. As seen in Figure 3, 
gate revenue tends to be from 20% to 40% of total revenue. Even with huge television contracts, 
teams still rely heavily on gate receipts. Some teams, such as the New York Yankees (70.26%), 
acquire over 50% of their total revenue from this one category. Clearly, the revenues from 
concessions, parking, and merchandise on game days do not make up for the significant ticket 
price discounts fans receive when purchasing tickets in the primary market. 
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    Figure 3 - Percentage of Total Revenue as Gate Receipts (2010-2011) 
 
                      Source: Forbes. 
 
 Rascher (2007) accounted for concessions sales in his study of the effect on revenue from 
changing ticket prices based on individual game demand, and concluded that the potential 
increases in gate revenue significantly outweighed potential losses in concessions revenue. 
Looking at the 1996 MLB season, Rascher discovered a significant advantage to allowing ticket 
prices to vary even slightly in response to changes in demand.
4
 
 Assuming that the losses from concessions and other sales are negligible relative to the 
potential increases in gate revenue, underlying factors may still prevent aggressive pricing 
strategies. Most obviously, franchises do not want their fans to feel alienated. Assuming that the 
presence of devoted fans improves the atmosphere of a game, all else equal, the more die-hard 
fans in attendance, the higher the quality of the event. If these devoted fans feel alienated 
because the owners are significantly increasing ticket prices for high-demand games, they may 
be less likely to continue attending, consequently hurting the quality of future games. 
 Another reason for keeping prices below profit maximization levels on average is to 
maintain a positive relationship with the local region. Assuming that everyone spends a certain 
amount of their income, lower ticket prices mean less of the income will go to the sport franchise 
and more will end up in the hands of other business owners. If the supposition of spending as a 
constant is relaxed, the lower prices benefit the region in the form of total welfare by increasing 
consumer surpluses. The consumer has the decision to either save the money he was willing to 
allocate to the tickets or spend it on something else. Since franchises often want the local 
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government’s monetary aid when building a new stadium, increasing total welfare through low 
ticket prices is an effective method of maintaining a positive relationship with that government. 
 In a 1997 paper, Daraius Irani studied the impact of sports franchises on cities. Analyzing 
whether a team brings economic growth to a region, Irani discovered that the results were 
inconclusive. Using data from MLB teams in 1985, Irani found that if the local government were 
to finance a stadium, costs would total approximately $27 million annually. If the total consumer 
surplus provided by the franchise were to cover this, the stadium would be an intelligent 
investment, but this was not the case. Irani calculated that the consumer surplus of a stadium 
ranged from $2.2 million to $54.1 million annually.
5
 This clearly highlights the risk of financing 
a new stadium or even renovations. While Irani’s study suggests that local governments should 
not finance stadium construction, they continue to do so, thereby giving franchises a reason to do 
anything to maintain those positive relationships. As long as the franchise can convince the 
government of the stadium’s benefit, low gate revenues may be a small price to pay for millions 
of dollars in financing. 
 Previously, empirical analysis of the demand for event tickets has almost always taken 
ticket prices as a given and focused on attendance as the dependant variable. Many attendance 
models include price as a variable but, since primary markets tend to price on the inelastic 
portion of demand, changes in price appear insignificant in predicting attendance. Bravo and 
Ferreira (2007) reach this conclusion in their study of the effects of several variables on 
attendance at Chilean soccer games from 1990 to 2002. Looking at eighteen teams across two 
leagues differentiated by club skill level, Bravo and Ferreira found that a better team, a larger 
local population, a bigger stadium, and a higher lagged attendance were all associated with 
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greater attendance levels. The surprising result in their analysis is the insignificance of having 
multiple teams in the same area. Bravo and Ferreira suggested that the lack of significance may 
reflect fans’ inclination to construct loyalties for teams.6 Accordingly, teams would not be 
competing against each other for attendance but simply splitting the local population into two 
separate markets. Since multiple teams would only occupy an area with a relatively large 
population, the market would still be large enough to support each team. 
 In his 2007 study, Buraimo investigated the factors behind both stadium attendance 
demand and television audience demand for English Premier League Football from the 1997-
1998 season to the 2003-2004 season. Like Bravo and Ferreira, Buraimo noted a significant 
positive correlation between historical attendance and team quality for stadium attendance 
demand. He also found a negative correlation with broadcasting. Showing matches on television 
appears to lower stadium attendance demand. Interestingly, when analyzing television audience 
demand using TV ratings as the dependent variable, greater stadium attendance was positively 
related to higher ratings.
7
 While broadcasting a game means stadium attendance demand will be 
lower, the lower attendance implies worse television ratings. Teams appear to acquire more 
money from broadcasting every year but, as these results demonstrate, owners must be careful 
that expanding broadcasting rights does not decrease attendance demand so drastically that the 
cost of fans not attending matches does drastically reduce the demand to watch the game 
altogether. 
 Knowles, Sherony, and Haupert (1992) used National League MLB games during the 
1988 season to test fans’ desire to watch a competitive contest rather than a one-sided victory. 
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Known as the Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis, the theory they tested conjectures that fans 
receive more utility from watching contests that have an unpredictable outcome and, therefore, 
ticket demand for these contests should be higher than demand for contests with a more certain 
outcome. Knowles, Sherony, and Haupert utilized betting lines to determine the probability of 
the home team’s winning and then used this probability as an independent variable in their 
model. As anticipated, they observed a positive correlation between outcome uncertainty and 
attendance. Also, by varying the functional form of the estimated model, they discovered 
diminishing returns for uncertainty. Finally, they calculated a home team probability of victory 
that maximizes attendance holding everything else constant. Their results reveal that fans prefer 
the home team to be a slight favorite.
8
 Since most betting lines are not available until a week or 
so before a contest, believing that teams can make significant extra revenue by changing ticket 
prices based on the odds of victory is unrealistic. 
 Instead of trying to understand the factors that affected demand across seasons, in his 
2007 paper, Rascher used the demand for individual games to demonstrate the advantages of a 
slight move towards variable ticket pricing (VTP). Rascher focused on the 1996 MLB season 
since it was the last season without any VTP. Keeping his analysis fairly conservative, he used 
linear demand and assumed that teams were maximizing revenue at the current average 
attendance, meaning that franchises set prices so that demand was unit elastic on average. 
Rascher created three tiers of games for every team depending on how many standard deviations 
an individual game’s attendance is from the team’s average single game attendance. Since he 
assumed unit elasticity on average, both the highest tier and lowest tier vary from revenue 
maximization. He made adjustments to match the attendance for that tier with its proper price to 
                                                          
8
 Glenn Knowles, Keith Sherony, Mike Haupert, “The Demand for Major League Baseball: A Test of the 
Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis,” The American Economist, 36:2 (1992): 76-77, www.jstor.org. 
9 
 
move back to unit elasticity and then calculated the change in revenue using this approach. 
Overall, gate revenue for the league increased by over $14 million or 2.6% for the 1996 season. 
Using the VTP strategies for ticket and non-ticket prices yielded a $16.5 million increase in 
revenue. Applying this strategy to 2003, Rascher measured an approximately $40 million 
increase in gate revenue and $60 million increase in ticket plus non-ticket revenue.
9
 Since 
demand for a game is almost certainly convex from the origin rather than linear and, as stated 
before, teams are probably not maximizing revenue even at average attendance, variable ticket 
pricing should significantly increase revenue without much cost. Figure 4 gives an example of 
Rascher’s approach using the Atlanta Braves’ 1996 home opener. While moving the price from 
$13.06 to $15.46 decreases attendance given the game’s demand curve, the higher price helps to 
increase total gate revenue. In general, increasing and decreasing prices from the average based 
on the individual game’s demand can help franchises capitalize on the consumers’ actual 
preferences. 
     Figure 4 - Optimal adjustment for the Atlanta Braves’ home opener (1996). 
 
                   Source: Rascher 419. 
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 Even without the information regarding how these minimal changes in prices would 
actually alter demand, Rascher’s analysis revealed obvious advantages to VTP. Since shifting the 
price of a ticket has a fairly low cost, the profitability of the change is undeniable. Although the 
revenue increases in the first season may be minimal, with each price change, franchises will 
better understand the forces that are actually driving demand. With this new information, they 
can more intelligently price tickets and increase the number of pricing tiers used. This is exactly 
the approach some franchises are starting to use. Whether relying on another company’s software 
or their own research, many teams are trying to implement a real-time pricing approach that will 
help them increase gate revenue. 
 Although low average ticket prices help provide a platform for the event ticket pricing 
problem, Rascher (2007) showed that demand for individual events is more useful in 
understanding the potential gate revenue for sports franchises. Each year, more teams are moving 
away from having a single price for a given seat throughout the season to letting demand help 
determine what the price should be. This approach is most obvious in MLB. Teams have started 
using factors such as day, time, opponent, starting pitchers, and even weather forecasts to predict 
demand and alter prices accordingly. Because of the recent economic downturn, in 2009, the San 
Francisco Giants decided to test the success of a dynamic pricing approach on their bleacher 
seats.
10
 Qcue, a company located in Austin, Texas that specializes in dynamic ticket pricing, 
developed the software used by the Giants’ organization. After seeing an approximately six-
percent increase in revenue, the franchise decided to dynamically price all single-game tickets 
starting in 2010.
11
 Russ Stanley, the organization’s vice-president for ticket sales and services 
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believes that while the aim is to capture a portion of the ticket revenue from the secondary 
market, the team has to be certain it does not alienate its fans in the process. 
 Due to its success, Qcue has seen a massive increase in its client base. An October 25, 
2011 press release stated, “Qcue clients now represent 95% of all dynamically priced baseball 
tickets.”12 This number will increase in 2012 when the New York Mets and Seattle Mariners start 
to use the software. The implementation of this VTP software is not however limited to baseball; 
it is also utilized in areas across MLS, NBA, NHL, and NASCAR. Interestingly enough, the 
article does not mention the existence of NFL franchises as Qcue clients although the average 
NFL ticket is over $20 more expensive than the average ticket for an NHL, NBA, or MLB 
game.
13
 In combination with game-by-game revenue, the fact that the NFL is at capacity so often 
suggests that intelligently implementing a dynamic pricing strategy has major potential for ticket 
revenue increases. 
 Another approach to the ticket pricing problem is a method called tiered pricing. Similar 
to real-time pricing, tiered pricing aims to capture excess demand but, rather than game by game 
changes, tiered pricing tries to take advantage of consumer surplus by offering higher ticket 
prices for higher quality experiences at a given game. Whether those would be better seats, a free 
hat, or a free meal, franchises that utilize tiered pricing hope that consumers willing to pay more 
than the average ticket price will spend the surplus on better tickets rather than save it. Every 
team implements a form of tiered pricing when they price at a higher rate tickets in sections 
closer to the action than those further away. Although some teams offer more tiers than others, 
this method has been the standard form of price discrimination in professional sports. The worry 
for many franchises when considering tiered pricing is that the top tiers will not sell. Not only 
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will this cost them some revenue, but it means that the seats seen most on television, those 
closest to the action, will be empty. 
 The best example of a tiered pricing catastrophe is the 2009 New York Yankees. Since it 
was the first year in their new stadium, the Yankees significantly increased ticket prices, offering 
seats in the top tier for up to $2,500 per game. Embarrassingly, they had trouble selling these 
high-priced tickets. After just two weeks of seeing only half of their most visible seats filled, the 
organization was forced to cut prices substantially. To avoid angering other fans, the Yankees 
gave free seats and other perks to individuals who had already purchased season tickets at the 
high price.
14
 Examples such as this seem to be the main reason for teams’ hesitancy to change 
ticket prices. While they may miss out on some demand, organizations would rather sell their 
seats at a low price and obtain some gate revenue than see those same seats go unused and then 
have to struggle to cover their expenses. 
 
B. Yield Management in Other Markets 
 This process of trying to understand consumer behavior and price accordingly is common 
across industries. In some, such as the market for airline seats and hotel rooms, consumers accept 
dynamic pricing while in others they seem much less tolerant. In areas of perishable value and 
fixed supply, attempts at maximizing revenue have two extremes. When demand exceeds supply, 
the supplier should raise the average rate so as to maximize revenue. Likewise, when supply 
exceeds demand, the supplier must try to use as much of that supply as possible by lowering the 
average rate.
15
 When aiming to maximize revenue, hotel owners and airlines must adjust prices 
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depending on the demand. Presently, consumers can see prices changing during the course of a 
single day depending on the number of rooms or seats available at a particular time. 
 In a 2004 paper, Anjos, Cheng, and Currie confronted the issue of pricing one-way 
tickets looking at the British airline industry. They created a revenue maximization model largely 
dependent on the number of people who wish to buy a ticket on a given day and the probability 
that they will buy the ticket on that day at a given price. By including a capacity constraint and a 
slight cost to making price changes, Anjos et al. showed the methodology used by an unspecified 
major British airline for pricing one-way tickets. The method predicted the number of bookings 
that would be made at a given price on a given day and if the actual number of bookings differed 
from the predicted, the price for subsequent days changed accordingly. Obviously, as prices 
changed, the number of bookings expected also changed.
16
 The methodology specified in this 
paper is similar to the yield management practices used throughout the airline and hotel industry. 
All of these businesses face a capacity constraint but must adjust prices often to fill rooms and 
seats capturing as much revenue as possible. The main difference between these markets and the 
market for event tickets is that hotel room and airline seat reservations are nontransferable. This 
important characteristic completely thwarts the creation of a secondary market. 
  Some primary sellers of event tickets have tried to apply this strategy. Since 2007, the 
Glastonbury Festival in England has forced ticket buyers to submit contact details and a passport 
photo when purchasing a ticket. Before the buyer receives the ticket, his or her photo and contact 
information are printed on it so that it is nontransferable.
17
 While implementing this throughout 
the entertainment industry would increase consumer surplus, it would also increase costs forcing 
the primary market to raise ticket prices anyway. By eliminating the secondary market, 
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nontransferable tickets can help firms understand demand and, consequently, vary prices more 
effectively, but their creation adds an unnecessary cost that the primary market would have to 
cover. 
 Although consumers seem to accept the hotel and airline industries’ pricing, they have 
been resistant to aggressive pricing strategies in other markets. In 2000, consumers discovered 
that Amazon.com was utilizing an individual’s purchasing history to change product prices based 
on individual demand. This meant that different customers would see different prices for the 
same products. One man even discovered that upon removing all electronic tags that recognized 
him as a habitual customer, the same DVD that cost $26.24 before was now $3.50 cheaper.
18
 
Patrons of the site were outraged, forcing Amazon to cease this method of dynamic pricing. 
Simply trying to take advantage of individual demand, Amazon quickly realized that customers 
would not support this aggressive pricing strategy. Similar to the New York Yankees, Amazon 
realized that pricing requires a delicate balance between maximizing revenue and maintaining a 
steady client base. 
 
C. Economics of Ticket Reselling Markets 
 Without more aggressive pricing, secondary markets will always have a way to capitalize 
on excess demand. Happel and Jennings (2002) analyzed the reasons for the lack of price 
discrimination in the entertainment industry. Looking at the pricing strategies common to tickets 
across major sports games, concerts, operas, movies, and other forms of entertainment, they tried 
to understand the reasons behind constant, unaggressive pricing and its implications for the 
future. While opera houses usually have numerous different ticket prices depending on the 
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quality of the show and a particular seat’s location, sports games and concerts commonly have 
only a few different prices depending on the location of the seat.
19
 Before the recent move 
towards dynamic pricing in sports, many teams maintained one price for a seat for an entire year, 
completely disregarding the quality of the event. 
 Similarly, many musicians including Billy Joel and Bruce Springsteen have admitted that 
they keep their ticket prices down so that their “true fans” can attend. DeSerpa (1994) 
highlighted the idea of concerts as a “mob good” since the audience’s actions and the 
performance are both part of the event.
20
 If this is the case, the buyers willing to pay the highest 
price are not necessarily the ones that make the best audience. Keeping prices low to allow the 
“true fans” to attend not only makes those fans happier, but also improves the quality of the 
event by enhancing the atmosphere. “By allowing relatively low-demand, raucous buyers a 
chance of admission, demand prices increase for all potential buyers.”21 Clearly, this concept 
applies to professional sporting events. The problem for the franchises is that both true fans and 
brokers capitalize on low ticket prices. If the team aims to stop the brokers, they risk losing the 
true fans. Ultimately, organizations tend to be cautious and simply let the secondary markets 
handle the excess demand. 
 Courty (2003) investigated the ability of a primary ticket supplier to successfully capture 
the revenue currently being acquired by the secondary market. Ignoring the existence of ticket 
resale legislation, Courty created a simple model where the primary seller could sell early, sell 
late, or sell some tickets early and some tickets late. He also simplified the model by creating 
only three groups of buyers: diehard fans (df) and brokers (br ) willing to buy tickets early at a 
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low price (p) and busy professionals (bu) willing to pay more for the tickets (P) but only at a 
later date. Assuming that there were more diehard fans and brokers than busy professionals 
wanting to attend a given event, it was optimal to offer all of the tickets for sale early at price p. 
Selling all the tickets at a low price to either diehard fans or brokers guaranteed a certain gate 
revenue to the primary market and avoided the risk of trying to sell all of the tickets late and the 
costs of competing with the brokers (br) when trying to sell tickets both early and late. 
 Courty explained that if the event promoter were to attempt to sell only enough tickets for 
diehard fans early at the low price and then raise the price for busy professionals in the late 
market, the secondary market would undercut the promoter’s late price either forcing the 
promoter to decrease the price back to the original low price or not sell the ticket at all. 
Consequently, the existence of brokers forced the promoter either to sell early or sell late. Since 
Courty assumed that diehard fans would not buy any tickets at the high price and that there were 
many more diehard fans and brokers willing to purchase early at the low price than there were 
busy professionals wanting to attend at the high price, selling only late at price P would result in 
lower revenue than selling only early at price p (              ).22 
 According to this analysis, the existence of brokers inhibits the primary market from 
capturing the demand of those willing to pay more for a ticket. As of late 2006, 27 states have 
laws regarding ticket scalping but the legislation and level of enforcement vary widely. While a 
few prohibit scalping of any variety, most have regulations forcing the scalpers to pay annual 
fees and limiting the markup of tickets. For example, Massachusetts law requires all resellers to 
obtain a license and allows these resellers to include “reasonable” service charges in their 
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prices.
23
 Similar to those in Massachusetts, many states’ scalping laws are vague and, 
consequently, difficult to enforce. Since no federal laws restrict ticket resale, ticket exchanges 
can simply take place in states without scalping laws if certain state governments strictly enforce 
their existing legislation. This implies that even where there are laws preventing brokers from 
marking up ticket prices or reselling at all, the government has an incentive not to enforce the 
legislation, so that the state captures the market benefits of these transactions. 
 
D. Pricing and the Internet 
 As Amazon.com realized, consumers see the internet more as a way to shop for the best 
price without having to travel from store to store rather than as a way for suppliers to gain 
personal information about customers and adjust prices accordingly.
24
 With the prevalence of 
ecommerce, most consumers believe that they can almost certainly find the cheapest price for 
any good online rather than in a store. Consequently, rational consumers will flock to the 
cheapest price for any good forcing the varying prices to converge. This concept is known as the 
Law of One Price. Specifically, the Law of One Price states that if a free market exists all 
identical goods will ultimately have a single price. Since online ticket resellers provide buyers 
with only the row and section for each ticket, a rational consumer should treat each ticket in a 
given row as an identical good no matter the reseller. This implies that if seats in a certain row 
and section are going for different prices through different resellers, the consumer will always 
purchase from the reseller with the lower price forcing the reseller with the higher price to bring 
that price down until it is at least equal to the price offered by the other reseller. While there is an 
abundance of literature rejecting the idea of the absolute Law of One Price looking at 
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international markets (Isard 1977; Crucini and Shintani 2008), since buyers can print most tickets 
at home or acquire them at the box office before the event, the cost of acquiring a ticket from a 
broker in one state versus another should be negligible. 
 Goldberg and Verboven (2005) looked at automobile prices and characteristics in five 
European countries from 1970-2000 to see if the monetary union and removal of barriers to 
inter-country transactions led to a convergence in prices. Accounting for shipment costs and 
exchange rates, the automotive industry is an example of a market in which the Law of One Price 
never seems to hold. Goldberg and Verboven discovered that while an individual car’s price did 
not converge to one value across all countries, there was a significant relative convergence over 
time.
25
 Because of the importance of an automobile to an individual, this market is one where 
consumers are likely to place a value on purchasing their car locally. Whether because of trust or 
future maintenance concerns, buyers tend to shop for cars in the vicinity of their residence; 
therefore, regional conditions and preferences affect prices. 
 The results of Goldberg and Verboven suggest that commodity goods with relatively less 
importance and even lower shipment costs are more likely to follow this economics law. 
Surprisingly, secondary markets for event tickets do not seem to abide by the Law of One Price. 
As shown in Figures 5 and 6, even in the week prior to the event, ticket prices vary widely and 
do not seem to be converging. Figure 5 shows available tickets in Section 112 Row FF for the 
December 11, 2011 Baltimore Ravens and Indianapolis Colts game. FanSnap.com reports that 
both StubHub! and AAATIX.com are selling tickets for this section and row but, after fees, the 
StubHub! tickets are $89.40 more expensive per ticket. Similarly, Figure 6 shows tickets 
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available for the upcoming New Orleans Saints and Tennessee Titans contest. Here, the tickets 
through RazorGator are each over $200 more expensive than the ones through StubHub!. 
 Figure 5            Figure 6 
      
      Source: FanSnap.com December 4, 2011.                  Source: FanSnap.com December 4, 2011. 
 Happel and Jennings (2002) presented their expectation of the development of a futures 
market for event tickets. Since demand for event tickets changes often based upon a variety of 
factors, instead of simply buying tickets from a box office and selling to the eventual consumer, 
investors should involve themselves by buying and selling tickets as if they were buying and 
selling any other futures. If an individual desired to actually attend the game, he would be forced 
to enter this futures market. The varying prices for identical tickets, displayed in Figures 5 and 6, 
imply a lack of such a market. Either there is no agreed upon price and these brokers are simply 
speculating on demand or there are underlying reasons why consumers would purchase the 
tickets listed at higher prices. A possibility supporting the latter explanation is the existence of 
relationships between buyers and ticket brokering sites. Since consumers can start accounts on 
most of these sites, there may be a convenience factor associated with purchasing through the 
same site every time rather than opening up multiple accounts or constantly reentering personal 
information. 
 The existence of ticket aggregator sites such as GoogTix.com, FanSnap.com, and 
SeatHound.com, which compare event ticket prices from a variety of brokering sites, would 
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seem to entail a convergence to the Law of One Price and, consequently, the possibility of a 
futures market. As these sites become popular and more reliable, cheaper prices should attract 
consumers more often forcing prices to eventually converge to a single value. Since demand for 
tickets will still change over time, the convergence to the Law of One Price would facilitate the 
creation of a well functioning futures market.  
 
III. The Ticket Resale Industry 
 Emerging in the 1990s and early 2000s, online ticket brokers have become an integral 
part of the ticket industry. By 2001, estimates of the number of US ticket brokers ranged from 
800 to 1,000.
26
  While many of these brokers serve only a single geographic area, they still affect 
the ability of primary sellers to capture market demand. Ordinarily, ticket sellers post tickets at a 
certain price and change that price whenever they want to. Once someone purchases the ticket, 
the host takes a certain percentage of the sale price and gives the rest to the seller. StubHub!, the 
most popular online ticket broker, charges 15% of the ticket’s sale price for the use of their site. 
Initially, these secondary markets simply linked buyers with sellers extracting revenue from the 
buyers, sellers, or both. The relatively new consolidating sites, such as FanSnap.com, allow 
buyers to more effectively find the site that offers the lowest price for the ticket they desire. 
Including the individual online broker’s fees on their sites, these aggregators force sellers to 
more intelligently price their tickets given the prices of competitors. 
 Some teams have tried to fight the secondary market, though. An example of this is the 
2006 New England Patriots lawsuit against StubHub!. Angry that some voided Patriots tickets 
were sold on StubHub! and that some real tickets were being sold at two or three times face 
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value, the organization tried to sue the online ticket broker using Massachusetts anti-scalping 
legislation and the team’s resale rules as their support. The franchise’s rule states that 
ticketholders may resell their tickets but may not do so for profit. Similarly, Massachusetts anti-
scalping laws only allow minor markups over face value and selling costs. Clearly selling tickets 
with a face value of $125 for $754 violates both of these laws.
27
 Ultimately, judges ruled that 
while StubHub! is allowed to sell the drastically marked up tickets, they are liable for damages 
caused by their sellers’ behavior when selling void or phony tickets.28 
 This resistance is not limited to sports. Established in May of 2011, the Fans First 
Coalition is a group of musical artists, sports teams, and event venues fighting against ticket 
scalping. In an effort to allow “fans to get access to reasonably-priced tickets” by stopping the 
“unscrupulous scalpers and ticket hustlers,” the Fans First Coalition hopes to increase the 
enforcement of current legislation and possibly encourage the creation of stricter anti-scalping 
laws.
29
 Although fans, teams, music artists, venues, and many others continue to oppose online 
brokers and their massive markups, the secondary market for event tickets continues to thrive. 
 Recently, online brokers have developed partnerships with some musicians, venues, 
sports leagues, and sports teams to become their official primary ticket resellers.
30
 An example of 
this is the Boston Red Sox 2008 agreement to use Ace Ticket as their official online ticket 
reseller, making them the first team to separate themselves from the deal MLB made in 2007 to 
partner with StubHub!.  Neither deal requires individual ticketholders to resell on a certain site 
but merely forms a partnership where the league or the Red Sox strongly encourage the reseller 
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to use a particular online broker. The Red Sox organization realized that they could not stop 
ticketholders from reselling their tickets so the organization might as well promote the use of a 
reliable brokering site. The important part of these deals is the requirements they place on the 
teams. The 2007 deal with StubHub! necessitates that if a team wants to resell tickets 
themselves, they must use StubHub! rather than search for the market that will benefit them the 
most.
31
 Since MLB redistributes the ticket resale revenue from the deal with StubHub! to 
individual teams, the agreement created a sort of revenue sharing structure.
32
 Although this could 
benefit the league as a whole, it may also have encouraged the Boston Red Sox, a team with 
relatively high ticket demand, to create its own partnership. Since there has not been much 
success fighting online brokers, partnerships such as these might become much more common. 
 For ticket brokers, NFL games seem to be some of the best investments. Frequently 
selling out, demand for tickets appears to significantly exceed supply. On July 12, 2011, Forbes 
released a list of the fifty most valuable sports franchises in the world. Every single one of the 32 
NFL franchises makes the list. Even more stunning is that not one NBA or NHL franchise and 
only five MLB franchises are more valuable than the least valuable NFL team, the Jacksonville 
Jaguars.
33
  Massive NFL media revenues may actually be the reason why the teams are avoiding 
dynamic pricing more so than other leagues. In September of 2011, Mike Ozanian, an Executive 
Editor for Forbes, reported that NFL tickets on the secondary market during the 2010 season sold 
for an average of $152 per ticket. That represents a 96% increase from the $77.36 average NFL 
ticket price displayed in Figure 1. New Orleans Saints and Chicago Bears tickets actually went 
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for more than three times face value on average.
34
 These figures alone highlight the benefits of 
understanding the demand for NFL tickets through the secondary market. 
 
IV. Data 
 As shown in the literature review, most research on consumer demand for sporting events 
has been done at the annual level. While this may highlight the determinants of a team’s gate 
revenues or ticket prices from one year to the next, it cannot capture game-by-game variations in 
ticket demand. Since most teams set their ticket prices well before the start of the season, much 
of the market demand research works with attendance data. Whether using the number of tickets 
sold or the number of fans who actually enter the game, attendance data still misses out on the 
variations of ticket prices in resale markets. 
 The focus of this study is the secondary market for NFL ticket sales during the 2011 
regular season. By evaluating the daily movement of prices in the resale market, I can better 
understand the variables that affect consumer demand from one day to the next. From the end of 
October 2011 to the beginning of January 2012, I used web scraping techniques to create a data 
set of posted NFL game tickets with almost 1.5 million observations. This data set will provide 
the basis for my empirical analysis. Capturing day by day movements, I can match up this data 
with changes in team performance variables and opponent competitiveness and strength 
measures to better understand the market value of the NFL tickets. 
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A. Possible Data Sources 
 While the secondary market for event tickets has increased from a few firms to well over 
1,000 over the last two decades, online ticket brokers 
have maintained their profits. In a 2009 article in the 
Sports Business Journal Daily, Eric Fisher wrote about 
the decreasing margins for these online ticket brokers, 
citing the proliferation of sites and, consequently, 
ticket options. He believed that with the recession, fans 
would be significantly pickier regarding prices forcing 
them to shop around rather than using a single reseller 
for every game. Similarly, fans may not even go to 
games if prices are too high. As seen in Figure 7, 
sports executives believed these theories as well. 
Possibly facing a shift in their market, ticket resellers 
tended to increase their inventories.
35
 These greater 
inventories allowed them to maintain profits with 
lower margins. 
 Surprisingly, the secondary market has continued to flourish. A 2011 Sports Business 
Journal Daily Article highlighted that although attendance in each of the major sports leagues 
around the US decreased over the last couple of years, the value of the secondary market 
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continued to soar, reaching $3 billion in early 2011.
36
 Clearly not suffering from the recession, 
secondary markets have attracted more customers every year. 
 Most ticket resale sites have very similar styles. Figure 8 shows the setup for StubHub!, 
the largest secondary market for event tickets. This is for a Red Sox game versus the New York 
Yankees in Boston. The portion on the left shows the customer an aerial representation of the 
stadium with ticket sections labeled. The tickets available are listed on the right of the figure 
with the price, section, row, delivery method, and quantity listed from left to right. Fans can 
scroll down on this side of the page or even move to different pages of tickets to find the section, 
row, and price that best fits their preferences. 
Figure 8 - StubHub! Screen Shot
 
 Generally, from site to site, most tickets seemed to be competitively priced. To the extent 
that there are differences in prices, those differences were between local and national ticket 
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resellers. While national resellers appear to only sell tickets that brokers or fans have posted on 
their site, many local resellers had exclusive listings for some tickets. Figure 9 shows a screen 
shot from wanatix.com, Wanamaker Entertainment Group’s site, for a Philadelphia Phillies game 
against the Boston Red Sox in Philadelphia. Wanamaker is a local ticket reseller located in 
Philadelphia and, consequently, has some exclusive tickets for Philadelphia games. Designated 
by a star, the first three ticket listings are for these exclusive tickets. They, and some of the other 
tickets listed by local fans, are often a better deal than similar tickets on national sites like 
StubHub.com. 
Figure 9 - Wanamaker Screen Shot
 
 
B. Ace Ticket 
 When investigating various secondary market ticket sites to decide which one or ones to 
use for my data, I realized that many of the same tickets appeared to be listed on multiple sites. 
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Brokers seemed to be putting their tickets on several sites for the same price rather than 
committing themselves to a single local or national site. Each group of tickets with a price and 
quantity (ticket lot) is given a unique ID number. Although, the ticket lot IDs were not the same 
from one site to the next, everything else remained constant. The presence of changing ticket lot 
IDs makes it virtually impossible to guarantee that the tickets on one site are or are not the same 
tickets being listed on another forcing me to commit to only one site. For this reason, ease of data 
access became more important than the quantity or quality of tickets listed. Ace Ticket of Boston 
quickly became a likely candidate.  
 While it is primarily a local ticket reselling market, Ace Ticket easily had enough 
observations for my analysis. Figure 10 shows a screen shot from aceticket.com, Ace Ticket’s 
website, for a Boston Red Sox game against the New York Yankees in Boston. Juxtaposing 
figures 8 and 10, it is obvious that the formats are very similar. The major difference for Ace 
Ticket is the order in which ticket information is presented. While StubHub! starts with price, 
Ace Ticket puts price in the fourth column with section, row, and quantity in the preceding 
columns. With both resellers, customers have the option to sort the offerings in a number of 
ways. 
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Figure 10 - Ace Ticket Screen Shot
 
 
C. Time Frame 
 Starting on October 27, 2011, I gleaned ticket price data from aceticket.com twice daily, 
for all available tickets for every upcoming NFL game. This continued until January 22, 2012. 
Over this time, I acquired nearly 1.4 million observations. Figure 11 shows the number of 
observations in that original data set for each day the scraping process was performed. The term 
“xdate” is used to refer to the date of the data extract. With a few exceptions, the number of 
observations tend to decrease over time. This happens because the later in the season it is, the 
fewer events there are left. Also, notice that some days are missing. Although the extracts were 
automated for 9 AM and 9 PM every day, the computer program would stop every once in a 
while when there were issues with the internet connection. This would lead to incomplete or 
missing extracts. While having the complete data set would be ideal, there are still plenty of 
observations available for my analysis. 
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Figure 11 - Observations by Day
xdate  quantity 
27-Oct-11 109,227 
28-Oct-11 106,874 
30-Oct-11 102,316 
31-Oct-11 100,565 
1-Nov-11 99,436 
2-Nov-11 99,784 
3-Nov-11 92,882 
4-Nov-11 185,558 
5-Nov-11 151,880 
6-Nov-11 91,847 
7-Nov-11 93,979 
8-Nov-11 144,115 
9-Nov-11 82,932 
10-Nov-11 163,492 
11-Nov-11 158,117 
12-Nov-11 154,589 
13-Nov-11 150,569 
14-Nov-11 145,796 
15-Nov-11 141,665 
16-Nov-11 132,574 
17-Nov-11 133,757 
18-Nov-11 130,577 
19-Nov-11 126,313 
20-Nov-11 121,806 
21-Nov-11 104,687 
22-Nov-11 54,175 
24-Nov-11 52,881 
25-Nov-11 102,487 
26-Nov-11 100,056 
27-Nov-11 96,752 
28-Nov-11 93,414 
29-Nov-11 91,784 
30-Nov-11 85,147 
1-Dec-11 79,246 
2-Dec-11 75,063 
3-Dec-11 47,029 
5-Dec-11 68,632 
6-Dec-11 69,586 
7-Dec-11 67,984 
8-Dec-11 65,395 
    
xdate  quantity 
9-Dec-11 62,987 
10-Dec-11 60,432 
11-Dec-11 57,633 
13-Dec-11 27,392 
14-Dec-11 26,691 
15-Dec-11 51,984 
16-Dec-11 49,275 
17-Dec-11 47,810 
18-Dec-11 44,142 
19-Dec-11 42,612 
20-Dec-11 20,895 
21-Dec-11 40,114 
22-Dec-11 37,764 
23-Dec-11 35,212 
24-Dec-11 34,091 
25-Dec-11 34,728 
26-Dec-11 35,636 
27-Dec-11 32,805 
28-Dec-11 30,769 
29-Dec-11 31,965 
30-Dec-11 32,142 
31-Dec-11 31,983 
1-Jan-12 30,438 
2-Jan-12 18,309 
3-Jan-12 15,905 
8-Jan-12 17,735 
9-Jan-12 17,502 
10-Jan-12 17,705 
11-Jan-12 30,136 
12-Jan-12 20,636 
13-Jan-12 18,922 
14-Jan-12 18,660 
15-Jan-12 13,659 
16-Jan-12 4,902 
17-Jan-12 4,058 
18-Jan-12 2,824 
19-Jan-12 1,508 
20-Jan-12 954 
21-Jan-12 482 
22-Jan-12 220 
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 The ticket prices ranged from $16 to $130,000,000. Figure 12 shows both the two 
observations with the lowest ticket prices and the one with the highest ticket price, no doubt a 
data entry error. The data strings for each observation included a ticket lot ID and event ID as 
well as all of the information included in the following figure. Many of the lowest priced 
observations were for parking and tailgating rather than actual seats. The last observation listed 
in Figure 12 is one of a few that I believe to be mistakes. There is no reason why someone would 
list a ticket on a secondary market for $130,000,000. This ticket is present in the data set from 
January 16 to January 18. There are not even any other tickets in the data set for San Francisco 
that have “PRICING BAR” as the section and row label. The PO designation at the end of this 
event designates that it is for a playoff game. The presence of these observations as well as non-
stadium tickets revealed the need to clean up the data prior to analysis. 
Figure 12 - Lowest and Highest Prices 
xdate edate event section row price qty  
11/13 11/13 Miami vs Washington 440 5 19 2 
11/30 12/4 Miami vs Oakland 454 8 16 2 
1/16 1/22 San Francisco vs New York (PO) PRICING BAR 130,000,000 1 
 
 
D. Data Cleaning 
 Since the focus of this paper is on tickets for seats, I eliminated some types of tickets. 
First, I dropped all parking and tailgating observations. This decreased the number of 
observations by about 12,000. If any of the options listed in Figure 13 were in the section or row 
column, the observation was eliminated. Looking at the data again, I noticed that teams like the 
Green Bay Packers offered skyboxes that often ended up making the data messy and hard to 
work with. Eliminating these from the data set only dropped the total number of observations by 
about 600. Lastly, I decided to only work with regular season data. Since the goal is to 
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understand the effects of daily changes on prices, playoff ticket data is not as useful. These 
games are all in very high demand from the time they enter the market. This brought my data set 
down to 1.35 million records. Lastly, to control for the days when I only got one extract, I cut out 
the second extract on days that had two leaving the data set at 700,125 observations. Figure 14 
shows the exact number of observations in the data set after each of the eliminations. 
Figure 13 - Removal of Parking and Tailgating  
Eliminated Observation 
Section/Row Label 
BLUE 
BROWN 
GREEN 
LOT 
LOTS 
MAROON 
ORAN 
ORANG 
ORANGE 
ORINGE 
ORINGEPS 
ORNG 
ORNGE 
P.A.R.K.I.N.G 
  
Eliminated Observation 
Section/Row Label 
PACKAGE 
PARK 
PARKING 
PKG 
PKING 
PKNG 
PRK 
PRKIN 
PRKN 
PURPLE 
RED 
TAILGATE 
TGATE 
TRAVEL 
YELLOW 
 
 
 
Figure 14 - Total Observations 
Data Set Observations 
Original qty 1,379,119 
W/O Parking qty 1,367,888 
W/O Skyboxes qty 1,367,264 
W/O Postseason qty 1,350,703 
FINAL qty 700,125 
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E. Team Level 
 Looking at the team level reveals some major differences in the data set. Figure 15 shows 
the total number of tickets and ticket lots for each team. Each ticket lot has a quantity attached to 
it. Summing these for each team reveals the total number of tickets. As shown, New Orleans has 
the fewest tickets (29,575) and observations (7,198) and Miami has the most tickets (186,444) 
and observations (45,199) in the data set. 
Figure 15 - Ticket and Lot Totals by Team
Team Tickets Lots 
Arizona 176,004 43,920 
Atlanta 171,274 32,824 
Baltimore 56,683 16,813 
Buffalo 79,858 18,597 
Carolina 40,066 12,315 
Chicago 59,690 19,780 
Cincinnati 104,743 28,734 
Cleveland 64,145 14,008 
Dallas 120,753 31,831 
Denver 29,871 10262 
Detroit 88,041 17,060 
Green Bay 61,918 20,296 
Houston 126,488 33,720 
Indianapolis 84,946 25,118 
Jacksonville 50,328 8,322 
Kansas City 148,702 30,963 
      
Team Tickets Lots 
Miami 186,444 45,199 
Minnesota 65,104 16,021 
New England 35,181 10,793 
New Orleans 29,575 7,198 
New York Giants 51,436 15,267 
New York Jets 75,784 19,084 
Oakland 91,732 19,616 
Philadelphia 49,216 14,762 
Pittsburgh 51,598 16,274 
San Diego 146,587 42,584 
San Francisco 101,755 30,480 
Seattle 102,228 24,984 
St. Louis 39,840 9,113 
Tampa Bay 45,234 9,761 
Tennessee 58,693 16,508 
Washington 137,846 37,918 
 Figures 16 and 17 show the movement of total tickets for each of the Buffalo Bills and 
San Francisco 49ers five games in the data set respectively. “Countdown” is just a measure of 
the number of days until the actual event with -60 being sixty days until the game and 0 being 
zero days until the game. The opponent for each game is listed at the top of each graph next to 
the number game it was in the data set for that team. For example, “1, Washington” means that 
this was the first game in the data set for that team and they played the Washington Redskins. 
The games with more observations highlight the obvious decrease in total tickets up until game 
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day. While the rate of decrease changes from game to game, the trend is evident among every 
team and every game. Figure 18 shows the total number of tickets and lots available for the last 
ten days before the game in the data set broken down by each day. Since observations decrease at 
approximately the same rate as tickets, a graph of observations versus days until the event looks 
nearly identical to Figures 16 and 17. 
               Figure 16 - Buffalo Bills Available Tickets 
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               Figure 17 - San Francisco 49ers Available Tickets 
 
 
Figure 18 - Last 10 Days before Games 
Days Tickets Lots 
0 8,049 2,445 
1 17,736 5,193 
2 25,452 7,399 
3 30,655 8,791 
4 30,858 8,800 
5 41,408 11,433 
6 43,324 11,953 
7 45,091 12,243 
8 48,511 13,205 
9 54,410 14,629 
10 55,139 14,813 
 
 Figure 19 shows descriptive statistics for the number of tickets left available the day 
before a game. Although the stopping of the program limited the number of these observations, 
each team has between three and six games contributing to this data. The figure shows the mean, 
minimum (min), and maximum (max) number of tickets available the day before each teams’ 
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games. The Dallas Cowboys have the highest mean (704), minimum (302), and maximum (1341) 
while the New England Patriots, Minnesota Vikings, and Carolina Panthers have the lowest 
mean (45.8), minimum (6), and maximum (59) respectively. Large numbers of tickets available 
the day before the game may signify less demand or more broker activity for that team’s games. 
If brokers believe there is money to be made buying and selling a certain team’s tickets, there is 
a high probability that the team will have more tickets in the data set. While Dallas’ summary 
statistics for one day remaining are high, their mean tickets figure is not that much higher than 
the average. 
Figure 19 - Tickets Available Day before Game 
Team Mean Minimum Maximum 
Arizona 297.0 177 595 
Atlanta 357.6 108 655 
Baltimore 88.7 56 114 
Buffalo 152.8 52 259 
Carolina 49.7 36 59 
Chicago  218.8 95 368 
Cincinnati 298.8 188 481 
Cleveland 354.8 62 579 
Dallas 704.0 302 1,341 
Denver 91.5 52 189 
Detroit 174.7 155 209 
Green Bay 219.0 63 492 
Houston 105.0 62 153 
Indianapolis 190.6 104 315 
Jacksonville 66.7 42 104 
Kansas City 291.2 54 644 
Miami 443.0 231 638 
Minnesota 110.5 6 236 
New England 45.8 9 117 
New Orleans 60.8 10 192 
New York Giants 87.3 25 148 
New York Jets 212.5 62 319 
Oakland 137.0 29 230 
Philadelphia 115.4 88 141 
Pittsburgh 82.5 33 205 
San Diego 237.8 99 472 
San Francisco 187.0 57 481 
Seattle 162.6 57 280 
St. Louis 173.8 55 435 
Tampa Bay 149.0 62 285 
Tennessee 214.8 41 377 
Washington 218.2 71 338 
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 Looking at ticket prices, I will continue to use Buffalo and San Francisco as examples. 
Figure 20 shows the movement of the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and 
maximum prices from October 27, 2011 to December 18, 2011 for the Bills’ December 18, 2011 
game against the Miami Dolphins.  With no exception, every statistic decreases gradually over 
time. From October 27 to December 9, mean price fell approximately $35 but then managed to 
drop another $32 over the next nine days. The actual numbers behind this Figure are in the 
Appendix. Figure 21 shows observations’ prices versus the number of days until the game. 
“DaysUntil2” is the same as “Countdown” where -60 is 60 days until the game. This Figure 
reveals slight convergence over time and explains the decreases in the summary statistics in 
Figure 20. 
               Figure 20 - Buffalo Bills vs. Miami Dolphins 
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               Figure 21 - Buffalo Bills vs. Miami Dolphins Ticket Prices by Day 
 
 
 Compared to Figure 20, the summary statistics for San Francisco’s matchup with 
Pittsburgh on December 19, 2011 shown in Figure 22 look quite different. Mean, median, and 
minimum prices increased over the entire period. Mean and minimum prices were actually about 
$200 higher than their October 27 values on December 5. Maximum ticket price was relatively 
constant until the day of the game when it fell over $250. Most of the statistics decreased at least 
slightly over the last few days before December 19 but not over the duration or with the 
consistency seen with the Buffalo tickets. Again, the numbers behind this Figure are located in 
the Appendix. Figure 23 charts price versus days until for each observation. It helps explain the 
variation of the summary statistics in Figure 22. Juxtaposing Figures 21 and 23 reveals a definite 
difference in demand between these two contests. Although ticket brokers have an incentive to 
decrease prices as the game approaches, there are clearly other factors affecting ticket prices. 
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               Figure 22 - San Francisco 49ers vs. Pittsburgh Steelers 
 
 
 
               Figure 23 - San Francisco 49ers vs. Pittsburgh Steelers Prices by Day 
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F. Price Index 
 Rather than simply using individual ticket prices or an average from day to day, I opted 
to use a Laspeyres price index whose general form follows: 
   
              
              
 
  is the relative index of price levels in the base period (  ) and the period in which the index is 
calculated (  ).    is just the price of good  . The ticket lot numbers are what made these 
calculations possible. They allowed me to track a lot of tickets and match up the prices and 
quantities over time. This helped me obtain a weighted average of the percentage of price 
movement for each game. To obtain my independent variable (      ), I set the original price 
level equal to 100 and let the changes in the price index increase or decrease the variable from 
that starting point.  
                           
Examples of the movement in this price index for Buffalo and San Francisco are displayed in 
Figures 24 and 25 respectively. The labels are meant to highlight a stream of points for a game, 
not a single point. The price index data for these Figures is in the Appendix. Similar to the 
movement shown in Figure 20, the price indices (PIndex) decrease fairly steadily for every one 
of Buffalo’s games except for the one on October 30 and this is probably only because of the 
limited number of observations available for that event. 
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               Figure 24 - Buffalo Bills Price Index Movement 
 
 
 For most of its games, San Francisco’s price index movement shows a similar trend of 
falling prices in the last four days as is seen in Buffalo’s games’ price indices. The difference 
between the two is that Buffalo’s prices appear to fall fairly steadily while San Francisco’s 
actually increased quite significantly for the two games with the most observations, before 
declining in the week prior to the event. Figure 25 shows that the index for the game on 
December 19, 2011 actually reached 159.9 on November 24. This means that ticket prices for 
that game had increased by almost 60 percent from October 27 to November 24, on average. 
Buffalo’s price index never surpassed 101.5 in the data set. Whether because San Francisco and 
Buffalo are on opposite sides of the country or because they had very different seasons, there is 
clearly a difference in demand for their home games and, consequently, pricing strategies used 
by brokers selling their tickets. 
NY Jets - Nov 6
Tennessee - Dec 4
Miami - Dec 18
Denver - Dec 24
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
P
In
d
e
x
Oct 29 Nov 12 Nov 26 Dec 10 Dec 24
xdate
41 
 
               Figure 25 - San Francisco 49ers Price Index Movement 
 
 Graphing this index versus days until the event highlights the ticket price movement 
during the final week. As seen in Figure 26, Denver’s price index plummeted during the final 
week for every game with a significant number of data points. Interestingly, the movement for 
the first forty days in the data set shows a steady increase in the price index for Denver’s game 
versus Kansas City yet the index plunged significantly more sharply than it did for any of 
Denver’s other games. Arizona’s price index movement shown in Figure 27 is fairly similar to 
Denver’s. The interesting game here is the one with San Francisco. The index increased as it did 
for Denver’s game with Kansas City reaching a plateau about twenty days before the game. It 
plummeted a few days before the game but never fell much below its October 27 price level. 
Whether this has anything to do with the quality of their opponent or their own result in the prior 
week remains to be seen. 
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               Figure 26 - Denver Index vs. Days until Event 
 
 
               Figure 27 - Arizona Index vs. Days until Event 
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 Figures 28 and 29 further highlight the effect of the last week on the price index using 
games for the Miami Dolphins and New York Giants respectively. Even without the individual 
game labels given in Figures 24 and 25, it is fairly obvious when each team had a contest. As 
long as a game had more than a couple of extract dates it followed the trend of falling prices 
during the last week. I assume that the reason behind this is ticket brokers would rather sell the 
tickets for something than nothing at all. This encourages them to drop the prices as required to 
make a sale. The abnormal movement in the price index for the New York Giants’ last home 
game probably had to do with their playoff chances. Still fighting for a spot in the postseason, 
this contest may have attracted more attention from fans causing ticket brokers to increase prices. 
               Figure 28 - Miami Price Index vs. Extract Date 
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               Figure 29 - New York Giants Price Index vs. Extract Date 
 
 
B. Independent Variables 
 For my independent variables, I use team and opponent strength data. Although each of 
these teams has a different target market, since I aim to explain movements in prices, I do not 
need to use city specific data. The team strength data used includes winning percentages, Sagarin 
ratings, and playoff chances. Created by Jeff Sagarin, the Sagarin ratings are a measure of team 
strength based on the current season’s games. 37 Sagarin uses wins and losses to calculate his 
ratings but also relies on other factors such as strength of schedule and margin of victory or 
defeat. Figures 30 and 31 show how winning percentages (winprcnt) and Sagarin ratings (Sag) 
vary over time for the Dallas Cowboys and Buffalo Bills. Since Sagarin ratings are updated on 
Tuesday every week while winning percentages change after each game, the x-axis movements 
                                                          
37
 Jeff Sagarin, “Jeff Sagarin NFL Ratings,” USA Today, www.usatoday.com. 
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
9
0
1
0
0
P
In
d
e
x
Oct 22 Nov 05 Nov 19 Dec 03 Dec 17 Jan 01
xdate
45 
 
do not actually match up the way they are displayed. The difference in movements is normally 
only a day or two so this generalization does not ruin the integrity of the Figure. Also, just 
because the Sagarin ratings are not posted yet does not mean the perceived strength of the team 
has not changed with their new result. The correlation between these two variables for Dallas is 
low (.234) while that of Buffalo is very high (.9727). As far as correlation between these 
variables is concerned, Dallas is an anomaly. 
               Figure 30 - Dallas Win Percent vs. Sagarin Rating 
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               Figure 31 - Buffalo Win Percent vs. Sagarin Rating 
 
 Looking at the movement in winning percentage and Sagarin rating for every team shows 
that while many teams’ values for both variables tend to be fairly constant, some teams’ values 
vary wildly from week to week. Figures 32 and 33 show the movement in winning percentage 
and Sagarin respectively for every team in the NFC East over the duration of the data set. 
Dallas’s and Washington’s lines stop on December 24 because the data for a team ends the day 
of their last home game. While Washington remains in a similar position on both figures, 
Philadelphia does not. Even with a winning percentage 20 points lower than New York’s, 
Philadelphia had a similar Sagarin rating from mid November to early December. Similarly, the 
winning percentage values appear much more spread out in relation to the Sagarin ratings 
throughout this period. The only exception to this is Washington who remained at the bottom for 
both measures for nearly the entire duration of the data set. 
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               Figure 32 - NFC East Win Percent 
 
               Figure 33 - NFC East Sagarin Rating 
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 The last variable also measures team strength but incorporates game importance. 
Although a team with a higher chance of making the playoffs can be thought of as a stronger 
team, if it is already guaranteed a spot in the playoffs, its remaining games are actually 
unimportant. For this reason, I will have to account for differences in games from week to week. 
Sports Club Stats uses each team’s current record at the time and randomly plays out the rest of 
the season millions of times to see how often a team with a given record relative to the records in 
the rest of the league makes the playoffs. The values for my study are taken from the weighted 
method where future opponents’ records and home field advantage are taken into account. This 
means that the predicted results favor the better team and also the home team rather than being 
completely random.
38
 Figure 34 shows playoff chances for teams in the NFC East and NFC 
North during the duration of the data set. Data stops on the day of a team’s final home game. 
               Figure 34 - NFC East and NFC North Playoff Chances 
 
                                                          
38
 Ken Roberts, “National Football League Playoff Chances,” Sports Club Stats, www.sportsclubstats.com. 
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 Considering the goal is to find variables that will change demand and, consequently, 
price, using a variation of this playoff chance variable will probably be more useful. This is a 
matter of testing functional form. Looking at the movement of playoff chances over the course of 
the season for the NFC East in Figure 35 shows their similarity with winning percentage and 
Sagarin rating. This possible correlation was important for deriving my approach to the analysis. 
               Figure 35 - NFC East Playoff Chances 
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winning percentage versus playoff chances, and Sagarin rating versus playoff chances 
respectively. These give a good visual representation of the correlation between the variables. 
Interestingly, the lowest correlations are between Sagarin rating and playoff chances and 
winning percentage and playoff chances. The reason for this is probably that the playoff chances 
measure considers future opponents while Sagarin rating (and winning percentage to a lesser 
degree) only considers past opponents. By finding out which one affects price index more, I can 
figure out how fans and brokers recognize a team’s strength. 
Figure 36 - Team Strength Correlation Matrix 
   winprcnt Sag po_chances 
winprcnt 1     
Sag 0.9336 1   
po_chances 0.8659 0.8673 1 
 
               Figure 37 - Win Percent vs. Sagarin Rating 
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               Figure 38 - Win Percent vs. Playoff Chances 
 
 
               Figure 39 - Sagarin Rating vs. Playoff Chances 
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 Figure 40 is a group of line graphs of winning percentage and the price index separated 
by opponent for San Francisco. The left y-axis is for the San Francisco’s winning percentage 
while the right y-axis is the price index. Looking at their December 19 contest with Pittsburgh, 
San Francisco’s winning percentage appears to have increased with the price index. Only once 
the winning percentage dropped did the index begin to fall. While most games’ price indices fell 
steadily over time, San Francisco’s only did so in the days just before the contest. Even looking 
at the game with St. Louis, the price index remained fairly constant around 100 until just before 
the game. It appears as if San Francisco’s success could have held the price index high for an 
atypical period of time. 
               Figure 40 - San Francisco Win Percent vs. Price Index 
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decrease in winning percentage. Similar to San Francisco’s, Detroit’s price index seemed to 
remain constant when they won. Still, the time remaining always prevailed in the last few days 
before the contest. Even when Detroit recently won in mid November against Carolina, ticket 
prices continued to fall rapidly for their game against Green Bay on Thanksgiving. 
               Figure 41 - Detroit Win Percent vs. Price Index 
 
 Comparing Sagarin rating and playoff chances to the price index yields similar results. 
Figure 42 shows Detroit’s Sagarin rating graphed on top of its price index for every game. While 
Sagarin rating seems to move less than winning percentage, it appears to match up fairly well 
with the price index. Similarly, Figure 43 highlights the expected result for the playoff chances 
variable. For the most part, as this variable grew, the price index grew. The effect of opponent 
variables is not as easy to predict. Opponent winning percentage, opponent Sagarin rating, and 
opponent playoff chances for the preceding teams are graphed with price index in Figures 44, 45, 
and 46 respectively. 
50
60
70
80
90
100
50
60
70
80
90
100
60
65
70
75
60
65
70
75
O
ct
 2
2
N
ov
 1
2
D
ec
 0
3
D
ec
 2
4
O
ct
 2
2
N
ov
 1
2
D
ec
 0
3
D
ec
 2
4
1, Carolina 2, Green Bay
3, Minnesota 4, San Diego
Win Percent PIndex
W
in
 P
e
rc
e
n
t
xdate
Graphs by nGame and Opponent
54 
 
               Figure 42 - Detroit Sagarin Rating vs. Price Index 
 
               Figure 43 - Buffalo Playoff Chances vs. Price Index 
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               Figure 44 - Detroit Opponent Win Percent vs. Price Index 
 
               Figure 45 - Detroit Opponent Sagarin rating vs. Price Index 
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               Figure 46 - Buffalo Opponent Playoff Chances vs. Price Index 
 
V. Methods 
 For my data analysis, I use simple ordinary least squares regressions. Utilizing multiple 
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effects allowing me to run each one using the entire data set. The team strength variable used in 
my final model was decided by looking at explanatory power and simplicity. 
 The groups of models in their order tested are listed below. I list all five variations of 
DaysUntil and their descriptions for the first group but only the basic linear form for the rest to 
avoid repetition. These five groups help determine which variable and form best represents the 
team strength side and which form of the DaysUntil variable has the most descriptive power. 
 
A. Winning Percentage Models 
 The winning percentage models incorporate home team and away team winning 
percentage to account for home and away team strengths respectively. 
                                            
                                                     
                                          
                                                
                                          
The first model is the most simple using only a linear form of days until the contest. The second 
form is similar but adds a dummy variable for whether or not the observation is in the last week 
before a game. Numbers 3 and 4 are logarithmic variations of the first two. The only difference 
is that       is the original last week dummy times the natural log of days until. Lastly, 
regression five is a non-parametric form of DaysUntil. 
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B. Sagarin Rating Models 
 Just like the winning percentage models, the Sagarin rating models use one home team 
strength measure and one away team strength measure. Obviously, the strength variable used in 
these models is Sagarin rating. 
                                  
The Sagarin rating group has a separate model for each variation of DaysUntil used in the 
winning percentage models. Refer to models 2 through 5 in the winning percentage models 
section to see all of the other variations. 
 
C. Playoff Chances Models 
 The playoff chances models are split into three categories based on functional form. No 
matter the variation, each home team strength variable has a corresponding away team strength 
variable. 
 
1. Linear Models 
 The linear models group has the same form as the preceding groups. 
                                                 
Again, this group has a separate model for each variation of DaysUntil. Those variations and 
their descriptions are in the section on winning percentage models. 
 
2. Second and Third Order Models 
 The first functional form variation of playoff chances run uses linear variables as well as 
second and third order variables for home team and away team playoff chances. 
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    is playoff chances squared and     is playoff chances cubed.        and        are 
the corresponding opponent variables respectively. As with every other group, this group 
incorporates separate models for each variation of DaysUntil outlined in the winning percentage 
models section. 
 
3. Non-parametric Models 
 To see if the structure of the playoff chances variable better fits another functional form, I 
run a set of non-parametric regressions. 
                                
   and       represent the decile dummies for home team and away team playoff chances 
respectively. Each form of DaysUntil is used in this group as well. 
 Using explanatory power and the functional form’s simplicity, I decide which variable to 
use for team strength and which form to use both for team strength and DaysUntil. I also include 
a brief exploration into the explanatory power of the non-parametric forms of playoff chances 
and DaysUntil when they are in the same equation as another playoff chances or DaysUntil 
variable respectively. This is useful in determining the extent to which the specific functional 
forms are impacting the parameter estimates. 
 
VI. Results 
 By looking at a general model with fixed team and game effects, I hope to find a team 
strength variable that effectively describes the movements in the price index. After choosing a 
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variable, I establish its functional form as well as the functional form for the DaysUntil variable. 
The results of these systematic steps make up the rest of this section. Each regression was run 
with fixed team and game effects. The coefficients and significances of those variables have 
been excluded from the results. 
 
A. Winning Percentage 
 The first set of regressions run were those with winning percentage and opponent’s 
winning percentage as independent variables. The results for the five regressions are listed in 
Figure 47 below. Winning percentage is highly statistically significant for every form tested. 
With coefficients ranging from .247 to .259, the economic significance of the variable changes 
only slightly. This means that, all else equal, a 10 point increase in winning percentage is 
correlated with a 2.5% increase in the price index. Opponents winning percentage is marginally 
significant with a one tailed test. The coefficient on winning percentage is approximately ten 
times that of opponents winning percentage. The adjusted R
2
 is lowest for the linear regression 
(.659) and highest for the logarithmic analysis that did not include the log of DaysUntil times last 
week dummy (.757). I only include the results for the non-parametric form of DaysUntil in this 
first Figure. They remain fairly constant when the strength variable changes. 
Figure 47 - Winning Percentage Regression Results 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)    
              PIndex       PIndex       PIndex       PIndex       PIndex    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
winprcnt       0.259***     0.253***     0.247***     0.247***     0.251*** 
             (14.73)      (15.71)      (16.62)      (16.62)      (15.97)    
 
oppwinprcnt    0.0198       0.0238       0.0225       0.0225       0.0266    
              (1.10)       (1.45)       (1.49)       (1.48)       (1.66)    
 
DaysUntil      0.473***     0.325***                                        
             (64.62)      (39.66)                                           
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lastweek                   -9.614***                                        
                         (-31.21)                                           
 
logDays                                  9.158***     9.170***              
                                       (88.53)      (74.99)                 
 
logLW                                                0.0340                 
                                                     (0.19)                 
 
1.weekdum                                                          12.05*** 
                                                                 (36.61)    
 
2.weekdum                                                          16.88*** 
                                                                 (49.37)    
 
3.weekdum                                                          19.62*** 
                                                                 (54.34)    
 
4.weekdum                                                          21.29*** 
                                                                 (56.28)    
 
5.weekdum                                                          22.60*** 
                                                                 (56.42)    
 
6.weekdum                                                          24.30*** 
                                                                 (56.47)    
 
7.weekdum                                                          26.07*** 
                                                                 (53.66)    
 
8.weekdum                                                          28.53*** 
                                                                 (47.03)    
 
9.weekdum                                                          30.17*** 
                                                                 (33.38)    
 
_cons          83.66***     91.96***     70.71***     70.65***     80.83*** 
             (33.16)      (39.59)      (33.05)      (32.65)      (35.90)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N               5145         5145         5145         5145         5145    
R-sq           0.670        0.724        0.764        0.764        0.738    
adj. R-sq      0.659        0.715        0.757        0.756        0.730    
rmse           7.501        6.862        6.341        6.341        6.681    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses                * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
B. Sagarin Rating 
 The next set of regressions were the same as the first except that winning percent and 
opponent’s winning percent were switched with Sagarin rating and opponent’s Sagarin rating. 
Figure 48 shows the results for each of the five regressions. Both Sagarin rating and opponent’s 
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Sagarin rating have positive coefficients and are highly statistically significant in each 
regression. Like the winning percentage models, the coefficients on Sagarin rating and 
opponent’s Sagarin rating do not vary much from model to model. All else equal, a 10 point 
increase in Sagarin rating is correlated with a 9.9% increase in the price index. Similarly, a 10 
point increase in the opponent’s Sagarin rating is associated with a 2.3% increase in the price 
index. Coefficients for opponent’s Sagarin rating are approximately a quarter the size of 
coefficients for own Sagarin rating. Yet again, the lowest adjusted R
2
 is for the linear model 
(.658) and the highest was a tie between both logarithmic models (.756). 
Figure 48 - Sagarin Rating Regression Results 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)    
              PIndex       PIndex       PIndex       PIndex       PIndex    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sag            0.991***     0.994***     0.985***     0.985***     0.994*** 
             (13.75)      (15.09)      (16.19)      (16.19)      (15.45)    
 
oppsag         0.243***     0.239***     0.226***     0.226***     0.232*** 
              (3.50)       (3.76)       (3.87)       (3.87)       (3.75)    
 
DaysUntil      0.473***     0.325***                                        
             (64.43)      (39.54)                                           
 
lastweek                   -9.682***                                        
                         (-31.39)                                           
 
logDays                                  9.181***     9.187***              
                                       (88.53)      (74.99)                 
 
logLW                                                0.0163                 
                                                     (0.09)                 
 
WeekDum          NO           NO           NO           NO          YES   
                                                                       .    
 
_cons          73.79***     82.10***     60.87***     60.85***     70.96*** 
              (26.79)      (32.44)      (26.11)      (25.86)      (28.91)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N               5145         5145         5145         5145         5145    
R-sq           0.668        0.723        0.763        0.763        0.738    
adj. R-sq      0.658        0.714        0.756        0.756        0.729    
rmse           7.520        6.873        6.348        6.349        6.690    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses                * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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C. Playoff Chances 
 Each of the last three sets of regressions looks at different forms of the playoff chance 
variable. No matter the results, I will maintain consistency between the own variables and 
opponent variables. These sets of models are compared amongst each other as well as the two 
other sets of team strength models. 
 
1. Linear Model 
 The first set of playoff chances models run were the simple linear models. This meant 
they only included playoff chances and opponent’s playoff chances variables. The results are in 
Figure 49 below. Both of the variables are highly statistically significant in every model. Once 
again, the coefficients are positive and fairly stable across the models. With a coefficient of .17, a 
10 point increase in playoff chances is associated with a 1.7% increase in the price index, all else 
equal. Likewise, a 10 point increase in the opponent’s playoff chances is correlated with a .5% 
increase in the price index. Opponent’s playoff chances is actually less statistically significant as 
well as less economically significant. The lowest t statistic for playoff chances (20.52) is much 
higher than the highest t statistic for opponent’s playoff chances (7.18). The lowest adjusted R2 is 
for the linear analysis (.673) and the highest are for both logarithmic models (.772). 
Figure 49 - Linear Playoff Chances Regression Results 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)    
              PIndex       PIndex       PIndex       PIndex       PIndex    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
po_chances     0.170***     0.172***     0.171***     0.171***     0.171*** 
             (20.52)      (22.80)      (24.68)      (24.68)      (23.32)    
 
opp_po_c~s    0.0565***    0.0531***    0.0501***    0.0501***    0.0508*** 
              (6.77)       (6.99)       (7.18)       (7.18)       (6.87)    
 
DaysUntil      0.471***     0.322***                                        
             (65.82)      (40.47)                                           
 
lastweek                   -9.706***                                        
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                         (-32.37)                                           
 
logDays                                  9.155***     9.159***              
                                       (91.40)      (77.37)                 
 
logLW                                                0.0119                 
                                                     (0.07)                 
 
WeekDum          NO           NO           NO           NO          YES 
 
_cons          87.69***     96.02***     74.58***     74.56***     84.77*** 
              (35.80)      (42.83)      (36.31)      (35.88)      (39.06)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N               5145         5145         5145         5145         5145    
R-sq           0.683        0.738        0.778        0.778        0.753    
adj. R-sq      0.673        0.730        0.772        0.772        0.744    
rmse           7.348        6.680        6.141        6.142        6.496    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses                * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
2. Second and Third Order Variable Model 
 The second set of playoff chances models yielded results very similar to the first. Figure 
50 shows the results of the five models. The first, second, and third order variations of playoff 
chances and opponent’s playoff chances are all highly statistically significant in every model. As 
expected, the coefficients are positive for the first order variables, negative for the second order, 
and positive again for the third order. Figure 51 shows the effect a change in playoff chances has 
on the predicted price index value for the simple log of DaysUntil model. Like the first set of 
playoff chances models, the opponent variables are less statistically significant and less 
economically significant than the own team variables. The effect of a change in opponent’s 
playoff chances for the same model is shown in Figure 52. This is the first set of models with a 
bit of variation in coefficients. While all of the previous sets had little to no coefficient variation 
across the models, in this set, the linear model, (1), has more extreme coefficients for the own 
team variables and less extreme coefficients for the opponent variables. There still is not a 
significant amount of change from one model to the next.  Like all of the previous sets, the 
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highest adjusted R
2
 terms are for the logarithmic models (.781) and the lowest is for the linear 
model (.682). 
Figure 50 - Second and Third Order Playoff Chances Regression Results 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)    
              PIndex       PIndex       PIndex       PIndex       PIndex    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
po_chances     0.656***     0.641***     0.611***     0.611***     0.628*** 
             (14.15)      (15.26)      (15.87)      (15.86)      (15.34)    
 
po2          -0.0106***  -0.00980***  -0.00924***  -0.00924***  -0.00930*** 
             (-9.90)     (-10.14)     (-10.43)     (-10.43)      (-9.89)    
 
po3        0.0000612*** 0.0000547*** 0.0000520*** 0.0000520*** 0.0000506*** 
              (8.83)       (8.71)       (9.05)       (9.05)       (8.28)    
 
opp_po_c~s     0.158***     0.192***     0.209***     0.209***     0.211*** 
              (3.51)       (4.70)       (5.64)       (5.64)       (5.29)    
 
oppPo2      -0.00380***  -0.00469***  -0.00536***  -0.00536***  -0.00515*** 
             (-3.66)      (-4.98)      (-6.23)      (-6.23)      (-5.61)    
 
oppPo3     0.0000307*** 0.0000362*** 0.0000414*** 0.0000414*** 0.0000388*** 
              (4.51)       (5.87)       (7.33)       (7.33)       (6.46)    
 
DaysUntil      0.465***     0.312***                                        
             (56.07)      (35.31)                                           
 
lastweek                   -9.740***                                        
                         (-33.01)                                           
 
logDays                                  9.061***     9.063***              
                                       (82.48)      (71.84)                 
 
logLW                                               0.00648                 
                                                     (0.04)                 
 
WeekDum          NO           NO           NO           NO          YES    
                                                                           
_cons          87.51***     95.90***     74.55***     74.54***     84.60*** 
             (36.23)      (43.53)      (37.02)      (36.59)      (39.73)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N               5145         5145         5145         5145         5145    
R-sq           0.692        0.747        0.788        0.788        0.762    
adj. R-sq      0.682        0.739        0.781        0.781        0.754    
rmse           7.245        6.564        6.017        6.017        6.375    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses                * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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               Figure 51 - Playoff Chances in the Simple Log Model (3) 
 
 
               Figure 52 - Opponent’s Playoff Chances in the Simple Log Model (3) 
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3. Non-parametric Model 
 The last set of playoff chances models run were the non-parametric forms. The results for 
these are displayed in Figure 53. As with the other playoff chances models, all of the variables 
are statistically significant with significance increasing from decile three on in these models. 
Coefficients tend to increase at a decreasing rate until the ninth decile where the difference in the 
coefficients for decile nine and decile ten is a bit larger than the difference between the 
coefficients for decile five and decile six. This provides further support to the third order effect 
found in the second set of playoff chances models displayed in Figure 50. The opponent’s 
playoff chances coefficients and significances are smaller than their corresponding own team 
values. Yet again, the lowest adjusted R
2
 (.690) is for the linear model while both logarithmic 
models have the highest adjusted R
2
s (.788). 
Figure 53 - Non-parametric Decile Dummies Playoff Chances Regression Results 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)    
              PIndex       PIndex       PIndex       PIndex       PIndex    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2.PO           3.195***     3.035***     2.746***     2.747***     3.188*** 
              (5.84)       (6.13)       (6.14)       (6.14)       (6.63)    
 
3.PO           2.656***     2.298***     1.724***     1.725***     2.276*** 
              (4.16)       (3.98)       (3.31)       (3.31)       (4.06)    
 
4.PO           7.111***     7.029***     6.354***     6.354***     7.114*** 
              (9.73)      (10.63)      (10.67)      (10.67)      (11.08)    
 
5.PO           13.36***     12.89***     11.82***     11.82***     12.79*** 
              (15.42)      (16.43)      (16.76)      (16.76)      (16.78)    
 
6.PO           15.50***     15.57***     14.51***     14.51***     15.75*** 
              (16.91)      (18.77)      (19.55)      (19.55)      (19.51)    
 
7.PO           17.80***     17.59***     16.42***     16.42***     17.61*** 
              (18.94)      (20.68)      (21.56)      (21.56)      (21.28)    
 
8.PO           20.18***     20.76***     19.80***     19.80***     21.12*** 
              (20.61)      (23.41)      (24.95)      (24.94)      (24.53)    
 
9.PO           22.28***     22.20***     21.49***     21.49***     22.17*** 
              (22.28)      (24.54)      (26.23)      (26.23)      (25.24)    
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10.PO          25.87***     25.47***     25.26***     25.26***     25.23*** 
              (22.89)      (24.90)      (27.03)      (27.03)      (25.44)    
 
2.OppPO         4.296***     3.339***     2.553***     2.554***     3.004*** 
               (8.00)       (6.86)       (5.75)       (5.75)       (6.35)    
 
3.OppPO         3.983***     3.053***     2.026***     2.027***     2.827*** 
               (6.53)       (5.52)       (4.03)       (4.04)       (5.26)    
  
4.OppPO         4.188***     3.511***     2.719***     2.719***     3.191*** 
               (6.00)       (5.55)       (4.75)       (4.75)       (5.20)    
 
5.OppPO         5.618***     5.121***     4.238***     4.239***     5.002*** 
               (7.19)       (7.25)       (6.70)       (6.70)       (7.28)    
 
6.OppPO         6.369***     5.358***     4.089***     4.091***     5.196*** 
               (7.05)       (6.55)       (5.63)       (5.63)       (6.54)    
 
7.OppPO         7.035***     6.387***     5.081***     5.082***     6.298*** 
               (7.78)       (7.80)       (6.97)       (6.97)       (7.92)    
  
8.OppPO         7.193***     6.250***     4.895***     4.896***     6.046*** 
               (7.74)       (7.43)       (6.51)       (6.51)       (7.39)    
 
9.OppPO         9.313***     8.228***     6.785***     6.786***     7.798*** 
               (9.62)       (9.39)       (8.57)       (8.57)       (9.16)    
 
10.OppPO       11.56***     11.20***     11.24***     11.24***     11.32*** 
              (10.62)      (11.37)      (12.49)      (12.49)      (11.82)    
 
DaysUntil       0.426***     0.283***                                        
              (44.05)      (28.98)                                           
 
lastweek                    -9.693***                                        
                          (-33.17)                                           
 
logDays                                   8.848***     8.859***              
                                        (71.63)      (64.53)                 
 
logLW                                                  0.0300                 
                                                      (0.18)                 
 
WeekDum          NO           NO           NO           NO          YES 
 
_cons          81.05***     90.65***     70.90***     70.85***     79.67*** 
              (32.23)      (39.51)      (34.25)      (33.85)      (36.05)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N               5145         5145         5145         5145         5145    
R-sq           0.701        0.755        0.795        0.795        0.770    
adj. R-sq      0.690        0.746        0.788        0.788        0.762    
rmse           7.152        6.472        5.916        5.916        6.272    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
t statistics in parentheses                * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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4. Second and Third Order vs. Non-parametric 
 Looking at all three sets of playoff chances models reveals the inferiority of the linear 
analysis. While playoff chance variables are highly significant in every set, the non-parametric 
and second and third order analyses have the most descriptive power. Testing the significance of 
the non-parametric form with the second and third order variables shows the strength of the non-
parametric analysis. Figure 54 shows this regression. While the non-parametric analysis remains 
significant, with the exception of playoff chances, none of the other playoff chance variables are 
significant at the 95% confidence level. Similarly, running an F-test for the non-parametric 
variables further highlights their strength. Shown in Figure 55, this test yielded a value of 13.90. 
Figures 56 and 57 give visual representations of the differences between the second and third 
order functional form and the non-parametric form for playoff chances and opponent’s playoff 
chances respectively. Both figures use coefficients from earlier models with the log of DaysUntil 
variable. In the first figure, the two forms differ most when playoff chances are anywhere from 
30 to 60. The second figure shows variation across the entire range. 
Figure 54 - Second and Third Order vs. Non-parametric Playoff Chances 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    5145 
----------+------------------------------           F(177,  4967) =  110.68 
    Model |  677576.261   177  3828.11447           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
 Residual |  171800.446  4967  34.5883725           R-squared     =  0.7977 
----------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7905 
    Total |  849376.708  5144  165.119889           Root MSE      =  5.8812 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     PIndex |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    logDays |   8.819387   .1237049    71.29   0.000     8.576871    9.061903 
 po_chances |   .2191083     .09568     2.29   0.022     .0315332    .4066833 
        po2 |   .0000637   .0020489     0.03   0.975    -.0039531    .0040804 
        po3 |  -.0000156   .0000131    -1.19   0.235    -.0000412    .0000101 
 opp_po_c~s |   -.198053   .1063592    -1.86   0.063     -.406564    .0104579 
     oppPo2 |   .0021016   .0021856     0.96   0.336    -.0021831    .0063863 
     oppPo3 |   2.53e-06   .0000134     0.19   0.851    -.0000238    .0000289 
       PO_2 |   2.935757   .4466967     6.57   0.000     2.060034     3.81148 
       PO_3 |   1.853543   .5220542     3.55   0.000     .8300863       2.877 
       PO_4 |   5.741887   .6713801     8.55   0.000     4.425685    7.058088 
       PO_5 |   8.552615   1.269325     6.74   0.000     6.064177    11.04105 
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       PO_6 |   8.082964   1.720443     4.70   0.000     4.710136    11.45579 
       PO_7 |   7.391249    1.96521     3.76   0.000     3.538569    11.24393 
       PO_8 |   10.38777   2.154588     4.82   0.000     6.163824    14.61171 
       PO_9 |   13.61397   2.354445     5.78   0.000     8.998217    18.22972 
      PO_10 |   18.34819   2.544418     7.21   0.000        13.36    23.33637 
    OppPO_2 |   2.552676   .4420798     5.77   0.000     1.686004    3.419347 
    OppPO_3 |   2.058188   .5019732     4.10   0.000     1.074099    3.042277 
    OppPO_4 |   3.188646    .629716     5.06   0.000     1.954125    4.423168 
    OppPO_5 |    6.33221   1.195974     5.29   0.000     3.987572    8.676848 
    OppPO_6 |   7.723357   1.764373     4.38   0.000     4.264406    11.18231 
    OppPO_7 |   8.917624   2.063066     4.32   0.000     4.873103    12.96215 
    OppPO_8 |   7.274925   2.189991     3.32   0.001     2.981576    11.56827 
    OppPO_9 |   6.010643    2.37221     2.53   0.011     1.360063    10.66122 
   OppPO_10 |   8.606768   2.586617     3.33   0.001     3.535856    13.67768 
      _cons |   70.72892   2.058491    34.36   0.000     66.69337    74.76447 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    5145 
 ---------+------------------------------           F(180,  4964) =  109.59 
    Model |   678607.59   180  3770.04217           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
 
Figure 55 - Non-parametric Playoff Chances F-Test 
------------------------- 
F( 18,  4967) =   13.90 
     Prob > F =    0.0000 
------------------------- 
 
               Figure 56 - Second and Third Order and Non-parametric Playoff Chances in Simple Log Model 
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              Figure 57 - Second and Third Order and Non-parametric Opponent’s Playoff Chances in Simple Log Model 
 
 
 
 
D. DaysUntil Analysis 
 The first five sets of models included a different regression for each DaysUntil variation. 
Reviewing the significances and adjusted R
2
 for each model eliminates the linear model from 
consideration. Although the logarithmic models had the highest adjusted R
2
, regressing the non-
parametric model with a logarithmic model tests whether the non-parametric model can help 
explain any variation beyond that of the logarithmic model. Since the last week multiplied by log 
of DaysUntil only improved the model slightly if at all, I have opted to just use the log of 
DaysUntil. Figure 58 shows the results from this regression. Looking at the weeks until dummy 
coefficients and their t statistics shows that, on their own, most of them are not statistically 
significant. Running an F-test reveals that they do have combined significance. As seen in Figure 
59, this test yielded a value of 10.54. Figure 60 provides a visual representation of the different 
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functional forms tested. I excluded the model with the log of last week variable because of its 
close similarity with the basic log model. The figure shows where the linear models differ 
significantly and how similar the log and non-parametric models are. 
Figure 58 - Log vs. Non-parametric DaysUntil 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    5145 
----------+------------------------------           F(180,  4964) =  109.59 
 Residual |  170769.117  4964  34.4015144           R-squared     =  0.7989 
 ---------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7917 
    Total |  849376.708  5144  165.119889           Root MSE      =  5.8653 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     PIndex |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         PO | 
         2  |   3.069056   .4494584     6.83   0.000     2.187919    3.950193 
         3  |   2.134144   .5247512     4.07   0.000       1.1054    3.162888 
         4  |   7.019295   .6004756    11.69   0.000     5.842098    8.196493 
         5  |   12.68199   .7128312    17.79   0.000     11.28453    14.07945 
         6  |   15.61456   .7550956    20.68   0.000     14.13423    17.09488 
         7  |   17.52711   .7738861    22.65   0.000     16.00996    19.04427 
         8  |   20.96415   .8053744    26.03   0.000     19.38527    22.54304 
         9  |   22.22633   .8214639    27.06   0.000     20.61589    23.83676 
        10  |   25.34422   .9276443    27.32   0.000     23.52563    27.16282 
            | 
      OppPO | 
         2  |   2.765546    .442203     6.25   0.000     1.898633    3.632459 
         3  |   2.508026   .5026931     4.99   0.000     1.522525    3.493526 
         4  |    2.98021   .5743513     5.19   0.000     1.854227    4.106192 
         5  |   4.756519   .6428111     7.40   0.000     3.496325    6.016713 
         6  |   4.819301   .7434902     6.48   0.000     3.361732    6.276871 
         7  |   5.784037   .7442214     7.77   0.000     4.325034     7.24304 
         8  |   5.527863   .7654092     7.22   0.000     4.027323    7.028404 
         9  |   7.327928   .7962614     9.20   0.000     5.766904    8.888952 
        10  |   11.05663   .8957295    12.34   0.000     9.300607    12.81266 
            | 
    logDays |   8.761823   .3282039    26.70   0.000     8.118398    9.405248 
  weekdum_1 |   1.887483   .4765704     3.96   0.000     .9531945    2.821772 
  weekdum_2 |   1.683841   .6348149     2.65   0.008     .4393228    2.928358 
  weekdum_3 |   1.056307   .7492845     1.41   0.159    -.4126221    2.525235 
  weekdum_4 |   .3337577   .8355645     0.40   0.690    -1.304318    1.971833 
  weekdum_5 |  -.3344925   .9083839    -0.37   0.713    -2.115326    1.446341 
  weekdum_6 |  -.6279605    .977491    -0.64   0.521    -2.544275    1.288354 
  weekdum_7 |  -.1172545   1.044522    -0.11   0.911    -2.164979     1.93047 
  weekdum_8 |   .7422979   1.135715     0.65   0.513    -1.484205    2.968801 
  weekdum_9 |   .7651724   1.310392     0.58   0.559    -1.803774    3.334119 
      _cons |   69.58633   2.100785    33.12   0.000     65.46787     73.7048 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Figure 59 - Non-parametric DaysUntil F-Test 
------------------------- 
F(  9,  4964) =   10.54 
     Prob > F =    0.0000 
------------------------- 
               Figure 60 - All DaysUntil Forms Tested in the Second and Third Order Playoff Chances Model 
 
 
VII. Discussion 
 Deciding which variable and form works best for a final model is about both fit and 
simplicity. On the team strength side, every form of playoff chances does better than winning 
percentage and Sagarin rating as far as descriptive power. Looking back at the correlation matrix, 
Figure 36, I realized that if any team strength variable were to perform much better or worse than 
the other two, it would be playoff chances. This is probably because it picks up on team strength 
as well as game importance. A team with a winning percentage of 50 may be considered average 
but if they are fighting for a playoff spot during the last few weeks, their games will be in high 
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demand. The same is true when considering opponents’ playoff chances. Changing functional 
form improved the model even more. Although the non-parametric analysis did best, I will stick 
with using the second and third order variables in my final model. 
 Similarly, the playoff chances metric considers the future schedule while Sagarin ratings 
only take current strength of schedule into consideration. The results imply that brokers and fans 
are more affected by the rest of a schedule as a whole than the games that have already 
happened. By this, I mean that the success of the playoff chances statistic reveals that the entirety 
of the rest of the schedule affects the ticket demand for each game. 
 As for the days until portion, the initial linear model does fairly poorly in comparison 
with all of the others. Most of the movement is in the last week so a linear form fails to capture 
it. Adding the dummy variable improved the model significantly but was not as good as the log 
models or the non-parametric model. Unlike the playoff chances analysis, the non-parametric 
form of DaysUntil did worse. Lacking significance in every analysis, I threw out the log of last 
week variable from my final model. The final model and its results are shown in Figure 61. Still 
using fixed team and game effects, this model explains over 78 percent of the variation in the 
price index. Every variable is significant with the natural log of DaysUntil having the highest t 
statistic, 82.48. Interestingly, the playoff chances variables decrease in significance while the 
opponents’ playoff chances variables increase in significance from linear to third order. The 
success of the log model has to do with its decreasing slope as values increase. At very low 
numbers, the slope is fairly steep, fitting the last week effect visible in the data set. 
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Figure 61 - Regression of the Final Model 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    5145 
----------+------------------------------           F(159,  4985) =  116.22 
    Model |  668925.116   159   4207.0762           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
 Residual |  180451.591  4985   36.198915           R-squared     =  0.7875 
----------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7808 
    Total |  849376.708  5144  165.119889           Root MSE      =  6.0166 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     PIndex |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 po_chances |   .6107273   .0384938    15.87   0.000     .5352624    .6861921 
        po2 |  -.0092359   .0008854   -10.43   0.000    -.0109717      -.0075 
        po3 |    .000052   5.75e-06     9.05   0.000     .0000408    .0000633 
 opp_po_c~s |   .2086765   .0370252     5.64   0.000     .1360909    .2812622 
     oppPo2 |  -.0053581   .0008594    -6.23   0.000     -.007043   -.0036733 
     oppPo3 |   .0000414   5.64e-06     7.33   0.000     .0000303    .0000524 
    logDays |   9.060537   .1098532    82.48   0.000     8.845176    9.275897 
      _cons |   74.55287   2.014084    37.02   0.000     70.60438    78.50136 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
A. Further Research 
 The most obvious expansion on this study is incorporating other independent variables. 
This data could be used to test the effects of major injuries on prices. Even if there is a change, it 
might only be significant for quarterbacks, running backs, and wide receivers (skill positions). 
Although non-skill positions are extremely important, fans may not care if these players are 
injured and, consequently, still have the same demand for tickets. Similarly, suspensions could 
affect demand significantly. Other possible independent variables include betting lines and 
rivalries. I was not able to even consider the latter possibility because of the limited number of 
games I had for each team. 
 Another way to expand this study is to get data for more than one season and see which 
variables affect prices every year. This could also show if strength variables are having more or 
less of an effect over time. I would expect that during a bad economy, there would be less 
demand making ticket prices drop faster. In this case, a bad economy would cause the DaysUntil 
variable to be even more significant. Team strength variables should always have some 
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significance but fan preference for other goods may change overall demand for tickets making 
the effect less economically significant. While this would be interesting to look at, it would 
probably require getting the data straight from a secondary market because of how many years of 
observations it requires. 
 In my literature review, I brought up studies testing the law of one price. This data could 
be used to test the theory simply by tracking ticket lot IDs every day. Each ticket lot has a 
specific section and row. If ticket lot prices in the same section converge as the game 
approaches, the law of one price may hold for these secondary markets. Similarly, other sites’ 
data could be used to see if the convergence holds from one online ticket broker to another. The 
issue with this type of study is that ticket lots come and go all the time. Determining if tickets 
that have been sold and tickets that enter the market late should be used in the study might be 
difficult. Without this data, there may not be enough observations in a section to notice any 
convergence for a single game. 
 Obtaining data from other sites expands possibilities even more. Since brokers appear to 
place their tickets on more than one site at a time, the movement in price indices from one site to 
another should be very similar. Additionally, the variables affecting price movement and their 
economic and statistical significances should also be the same. 
 Finally, the most interesting possibility for this data is seeing the differences between 
teams. My data section showed that there is definitely some variability in the 2011 season 
between San Francisco’s and Buffalo’s demand functions. Running these sets of regressions over 
every team individually would reveal which variables matter for which teams. Maybe there are 
regional differences and the games in a certain area are less affected by the number of days until 
the contest. While this might signify a location effect, it may actually be a divisional effect. Also, 
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doing this type of analysis would help determine what changes ticket prices for teams who are 
consistently strong or consistently weak. The Green Bay Packers had over a 95% chance of 
making the playoffs from week 5 on so movements in that variable probably had little to no 
affect on ticket prices. Alternatively, the Miami Dolphins had less than a 5% chance of making 
the playoffs from week 2 on. Are opponent variables more significant for teams at the extremes 
of the team strength measures? Similarly, is there a difference in the way ticket prices move over 
time for a game in week 5 when both teams have a 50% chance of making the playoffs and a 
game in week 17 when their odds are the same? Some teams’ tickets may only experience the 
days until effect while others do not at all. 
 
B. Conclusion 
 My analysis highlights the effect of movements in team strength on ticket prices and, 
more importantly, emphasizes the rapid price decreases just before a game. Ticket brokers do not 
want to get stuck with tickets and, consequently, drop their value significantly the week before a 
contest. Although playoff chances explained price index movement the best, each of the team 
strength variables was highly significant by itself. Ultimately, as expected, the most important 
variable in determining ticket price movement was the number of days until a game. While it fell 
gradually most of the time, nearly every game’s price index dropped drastically over the final 
week. This information implies that it may be more difficult for NFL teams to capture ticket 
demand than I previously thought. While ticket brokers can increase prices as often as they want 
and still feel comfortable dropping those prices in the last week, teams must be careful not to 
alienate their fans. Even if NFL teams do not want to risk dynamically pricing tickets for fear of 
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not selling out, the astronomical price markups for tickets on the secondary market indicates that 
they can still make more gate revenue by more aggressively pricing their tickets initially. 
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Appendix 
Price Statistics - Buffalo 
xdate Mean Median StdDev Min Max 
27-Oct  $145.91   $130.70   $ 56.69   $ 70.00   $360.50  
28-Oct  $145.26   $130.70   $ 56.25   $ 70.00   $360.50  
30-Oct  $148.71   $130.70   $ 57.11   $ 70.00   $360.50  
31-Oct  $147.97   $130.70   $ 56.38   $ 70.00   $360.50  
1-Nov  $149.22   $130.70   $ 57.09   $ 70.00   $360.50  
2-Nov  $125.47   $120.00   $ 31.16   $ 70.00   $195.00  
3-Nov  $152.56   $135.20   $ 57.15   $ 75.00   $360.50  
4-Nov  $149.26   $130.70   $ 55.73   $ 75.00   $360.50  
5-Nov  $148.82   $130.70   $ 55.89   $ 75.00   $360.50  
6-Nov  $149.05   $130.70   $ 56.34   $ 75.00   $360.50  
7-Nov  $148.18   $130.70   $ 55.39   $ 75.00   $355.00  
8-Nov  $149.10   $130.70   $ 56.55   $ 75.00   $360.50  
9-Nov  $141.67   $130.00   $ 53.33   $ 75.00   $360.50  
10-Nov  $140.99   $130.00   $ 51.80   $ 75.00   $355.00  
11-Nov  $141.38   $130.00   $ 52.97   $ 75.00   $360.50  
12-Nov  $141.78   $130.00   $ 54.08   $ 75.00   $360.50  
13-Nov  $141.67   $125.50   $ 54.42   $ 75.00   $360.50  
14-Nov  $136.98   $125.20   $ 53.56   $ 75.00   $360.50  
15-Nov  $135.53   $120.00   $ 52.64   $ 75.00   $355.00  
16-Nov  $135.16   $120.00   $ 53.17   $ 75.00   $355.00  
17-Nov  $135.61   $120.00   $ 53.44   $ 75.00   $355.00  
18-Nov  $135.21   $120.00   $ 53.00   $ 75.00   $355.00  
19-Nov  $135.07   $120.00   $ 52.50   $ 75.00   $355.00  
20-Nov  $134.63   $120.00   $ 52.44   $ 70.00   $355.00  
21-Nov  $129.71   $115.10   $ 50.23   $ 65.00   $355.00  
22-Nov  $125.57   $110.50   $ 47.60   $ 65.00   $335.40  
24-Nov  $124.10   $110.50   $ 44.02   $ 65.00   $315.00  
25-Nov  $124.03   $110.50   $ 43.84   $ 65.00   $315.00  
26-Nov  $124.77   $110.50   $ 45.30   $ 65.00   $320.50  
27-Nov  $124.01   $110.50   $ 44.18   $ 65.00   $315.00  
28-Nov  $122.64   $110.50   $ 43.27   $ 60.00   $315.00  
29-Nov  $116.54   $105.00   $ 42.90   $ 60.00   $310.70  
30-Nov  $116.00   $105.00   $ 42.46   $ 60.00   $310.70  
1-Dec  $118.74   $110.00   $ 44.16   $ 55.00   $310.70  
2-Dec  $117.26   $105.00   $ 40.69   $ 55.00   $295.50  
3-Dec  $116.52   $105.00   $ 40.15   $ 55.00   $295.50  
5-Dec  $113.91   $105.00   $ 40.13   $ 60.00   $310.70  
6-Dec  $111.45   $105.00   $ 36.03   $ 60.00   $260.00  
7-Dec  $111.30   $105.00   $ 36.03   $ 65.00   $265.20  
8-Dec  $109.85   $100.00   $ 36.29   $ 65.00   $265.20  
9-Dec  $110.73   $105.00   $ 35.29   $ 65.00   $265.20  
10-Dec  $109.10   $100.00   $ 33.85   $ 65.00   $245.80  
11-Dec  $108.55   $100.00   $ 33.41   $ 65.00   $230.50  
13-Dec  $101.50   $ 95.00   $ 33.19   $ 55.00   $215.20  
14-Dec  $ 96.46   $ 95.00   $ 28.64   $ 60.00   $215.20  
15-Dec  $ 96.53   $ 95.00   $ 30.21   $ 55.00   $215.20  
16-Dec  $ 91.79   $ 80.00   $ 32.73   $ 55.00   $215.20  
17-Dec  $ 83.78   $ 70.00   $ 36.34   $ 55.00   $215.20  
18-Dec  $ 78.71   $ 65.00   $ 48.88   $ 50.00   $215.20  
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Price Statistics - San Francisco 
xdate   Mean   Median   StdDev   Min   Max  
27-Oct  $ 340.84   $ 295.50   $166.61   $145.60   $1,015.00  
28-Oct  $ 337.02   $ 295.50   $165.31   $150.20   $1,015.00  
30-Oct  $ 350.34   $ 305.90   $174.59   $160.00   $1,015.00  
31-Oct  $ 347.05   $ 315.15   $150.24   $165.10   $  975.00  
1-Nov  $ 359.61   $ 320.50   $168.27   $165.10   $1,015.00  
2-Nov  $ 371.81   $ 325.00   $171.60   $180.70   $1,015.00  
3-Nov  $ 363.77   $ 325.00   $169.19   $185.00   $  975.00  
4-Nov  $ 361.20   $ 320.50   $167.57   $185.00   $  975.00  
5-Nov  $ 357.79   $ 315.00   $165.06   $185.00   $  975.00  
6-Nov  $ 370.20   $ 320.72   $171.09   $190.50   $  975.00  
7-Nov  $ 382.09   $ 325.00   $174.44   $185.30   $  975.00  
8-Nov  $ 393.46   $ 335.50   $173.75   $190.50   $  975.00  
9-Nov  $ 404.33   $ 360.50   $169.56   $220.70   $  975.00  
10-Nov  $ 404.49   $ 360.50   $171.54   $210.70   $  975.00  
11-Nov  $ 409.63   $ 365.70   $173.70   $220.70   $  975.00  
12-Nov  $ 413.67   $ 370.50   $175.48   $230.20   $  975.00  
13-Nov  $ 421.86   $ 370.50   $176.07   $235.00   $  975.00  
14-Nov  $ 439.61   $ 390.00   $181.02   $240.20   $  980.30  
15-Nov  $ 465.31   $ 410.55   $186.66   $240.20   $  980.30  
16-Nov  $ 482.62   $ 425.50   $193.66   $275.00   $  980.30  
17-Nov  $ 493.28   $ 445.00   $189.14   $295.50   $  980.30  
18-Nov  $ 490.68   $ 455.05   $170.80   $295.50   $  980.30  
19-Nov  $ 502.91   $ 470.30   $166.92   $310.80   $  980.30  
20-Nov  $ 518.24   $ 480.10   $169.39   $310.80   $  980.30  
21-Nov  $ 517.02   $ 470.30   $165.01   $320.50   $  985.01  
22-Nov  $ 510.88   $ 465.50   $160.73   $320.50   $  985.01  
24-Nov  $ 521.47   $ 485.00   $144.60   $360.20   $  975.00  
25-Nov  $ 519.53   $ 485.00   $146.86   $360.20   $  985.01  
26-Nov  $ 516.67   $ 485.00   $149.56   $355.00   $  985.01  
27-Nov  $ 513.28   $ 482.85   $147.89   $355.00   $  975.00  
28-Nov  $ 527.67   $ 485.00   $160.14   $335.50   $  975.00  
29-Nov  $ 543.24   $ 487.75   $176.18   $325.70   $  985.01  
30-Nov  $ 546.71   $ 490.50   $176.16   $325.70   $  985.01  
1-Dec  $ 549.03   $ 480.70   $179.54   $310.40   $  985.01  
2-Dec  $ 551.69   $ 487.75   $181.44   $310.40   $  985.01  
3-Dec  $ 552.14   $ 490.50   $181.90   $300.70   $  975.00  
5-Dec  $ 560.06   $ 500.50   $181.41   $345.50   $  985.01  
6-Dec  $ 557.65   $ 485.00   $183.68   $320.50   $  985.01  
7-Dec  $ 551.33   $ 490.15   $179.51   $325.00   $  985.01  
8-Dec  $ 545.18   $ 465.50   $181.17   $345.50   $  975.00  
9-Dec  $ 540.43   $ 465.50   $185.02   $335.50   $  985.01  
10-Dec  $ 540.70   $ 455.00   $190.13   $315.00   $  985.01  
11-Dec  $ 540.52   $ 455.00   $188.89   $315.00   $  985.01  
13-Dec  $ 492.06   $ 425.50   $176.34   $290.00   $  975.00  
14-Dec  $ 481.79   $ 450.00   $175.89   $285.70   $  975.00  
15-Dec  $ 483.23   $ 455.00   $164.32   $285.70   $  975.00  
16-Dec  $ 480.52   $ 445.15   $153.58   $295.20   $  845.00  
17-Dec  $ 506.42   $ 455.00   $161.59   $310.80   $  975.00  
18-Dec  $ 507.95   $ 480.60   $153.45   $355.90   $  910.00  
19-Dec  $ 458.61   $ 455.00   $ 78.93   $355.90   $  650.00  
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Buffalo Price Index Movement 
  edate 
xdate 30-Oct 6-Nov 4-Dec 18-Dec 24-Dec 
27-Oct 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
28-Oct 101.63 99.88 100.00 100.00 99.83 
30-Oct   99.88 101.05 101.06 100.89 
31-Oct   99.12 101.41 101.17 100.55 
1-Nov   98.83 100.10 101.14 100.36 
2-Nov   93.52 100.02 101.06 100.28 
3-Nov   91.63 99.86 101.06 100.25 
4-Nov   93.66 98.58 101.12 100.21 
5-Nov   90.37 98.28 101.09 100.19 
6-Nov     98.14 101.08 100.19 
7-Nov     97.87 101.13 99.87 
8-Nov     97.63 101.02 99.76 
9-Nov     96.85 98.52 98.90 
10-Nov     96.47 96.99 97.91 
11-Nov     96.40 96.95 97.16 
12-Nov     96.33 96.95 96.99 
13-Nov     96.33 96.95 96.86 
14-Nov     93.43 95.43 95.54 
15-Nov     90.18 94.37 95.03 
16-Nov     88.73 93.17 93.91 
17-Nov     87.30 92.67 93.47 
18-Nov     86.32 92.07 93.28 
19-Nov     85.51 91.92 93.30 
20-Nov     85.14 91.92 93.31 
21-Nov     83.56 91.28 92.97 
22-Nov       87.64 92.05 
24-Nov     81.61 86.54 91.49 
25-Nov     81.60 86.54 91.49 
26-Nov     79.61 86.09 90.89 
27-Nov     78.09 85.91 90.71 
28-Nov     75.87 85.80 90.56 
29-Nov     66.15 83.39 89.10 
30-Nov     65.14 80.58 85.67 
1-Dec     59.73 78.90 84.38 
2-Dec     55.35 77.30 83.23 
3-Dec     50.59 76.95 82.60 
5-Dec       76.53 82.03 
6-Dec       75.35 80.79 
7-Dec       74.19 79.96 
8-Dec       73.11 79.64 
9-Dec       71.96 79.36 
10-Dec       70.75 78.43 
11-Dec       69.37 77.91 
13-Dec       67.42 76.70 
14-Dec       64.31 74.04 
15-Dec       61.90 72.16 
16-Dec       60.57 71.90 
17-Dec       50.70 70.78 
18-Dec       44.66 69.79 
19-Dec         67.71 
20-Dec         65.13 
21-Dec         63.25 
22-Dec         61.65 
23-Dec         60.01 
24-Dec         38.58 
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San Francisco Price Index Movement 
  edate 
xdate 30-Oct 13-Nov 20-Nov 4-Dec 19-Dec 
27-Oct 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
28-Oct 89.87 101.27 99.33 98.87 100.14 
30-Oct 
 
103.09 100.03 99.41 101.92 
31-Oct 
 
104.22 99.34 99.79 105.34 
1-Nov 
 
104.74 98.75 99.50 107.24 
2-Nov 
 
104.46 98.24 99.52 107.87 
3-Nov 
 
104.09 98.08 99.38 108.55 
4-Nov 
 
103.87 98.43 99.09 108.60 
5-Nov 
 
103.44 98.48 99.02 108.79 
6-Nov 
 
103.57 99.47 99.13 109.36 
7-Nov 
 
105.33 99.96 99.53 114.25 
8-Nov 
 
106.12 98.60 100.94 116.75 
9-Nov 
 
103.83 97.83 101.82 119.14 
10-Nov 
 
103.81 97.63 101.91 120.24 
11-Nov 
 
101.99 97.54 102.21 120.79 
12-Nov 
 
97.89 98.30 102.82 122.22 
13-Nov 
 
94.07 98.97 102.86 123.15 
14-Nov 
 
  101.00 104.69 126.24 
15-Nov 
 
  100.47 106.46 131.27 
16-Nov 
 
  97.47 106.65 134.74 
17-Nov 
 
  91.43 106.71 137.42 
18-Nov 
 
  84.52 106.83 142.25 
19-Nov 
 
  78.19 106.97 149.66 
20-Nov 
 
  70.40 105.67 153.64 
21-Nov 
 
    102.82 157.59 
22-Nov 
 
    102.23 158.42 
24-Nov 
 
    101.70 159.90 
25-Nov 
 
    101.49 159.90 
26-Nov 
 
    101.73 157.58 
27-Nov 
 
    102.44 157.43 
28-Nov 
 
    101.67 157.16 
29-Nov 
 
    99.57 155.36 
30-Nov 
 
    94.25 155.28 
1-Dec 
 
    92.16 155.41 
2-Dec 
 
    89.64 154.06 
3-Dec 
 
    86.67 151.27 
5-Dec 
 
      151.57 
6-Dec 
 
      151.62 
7-Dec 
 
      151.44 
8-Dec 
 
      151.27 
9-Dec 
 
      148.93 
10-Dec 
 
      147.66 
11-Dec 
 
      146.24 
13-Dec 
 
      140.69 
14-Dec 
 
      136.03 
15-Dec 
 
      132.83 
16-Dec 
 
      126.49 
17-Dec 
 
      126.16 
18-Dec 
 
      126.95 
19-Dec        129.84 
 
